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Introduction
In my first year of my Computer Science degree, if somebody had told me that the few years
ahead of me could have been the last ones of the so-called PC-era, I would have hardly
believed him. Sure, I could imagine computers becoming smaller, faster and cheaper, but
I could have never imagined that in such a short time the focus of the market would have
so dramatically shifted from PCs to personal devices. Today, smartphones and tablets have
become our inseparable companions, changing for the better numerous aspects of our daily
life. The way we plan our days, we communicate with people, we listen to music, we
search for information, we take pictures, we spend our free time and the way we note our
ideas has been totally revolutionized thanks to them. At the same time, thanks also to the
rapid growth of the Cloud Computing based services, most of our data and of the Internet
services that we use every day are just a login-distance away from any device connected
to the Internet that we can find around us. We can edit our documents, look our and our
friends’ pictures and videos, share our thoughts, access our bank account, pay our taxes
using a familiar interface independently from where we are. What is the most fascinating
thing is that all these new possibilities are not anymore at the hand of technically-savvy
geeks only, but they are available to newer and older generations alike thanks to the efforts
that recently have been put into building user interfaces that feel more natural and intuitive
even to totally unexperienced users.
Despite of that, we are still far from an ideal world. Service providers, software en-
gineers, hardware manufacturers and security experts are having a hard time in trying to
satisfy the always growing expectations of a number of users that is steadily increasing
every day. People are always longing for faster mobile connectivity at lower prices, for
longer lasting batteries and for more powerful devices. On top of that, users are more and
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more exposed to new security threats, either because they tend to ignore even the most
basic security-practices, or because virus writers have found new ways to exploit the now
world-sized market of mobile devices.
For instance, more people accessing the Internet from their mobile devices forces the
existing network infrastructure to be continuously updated in order to cope with the con-
stantly increase in data consumption. As a consequence, AT&T’s subscribers in the United
States were getting extremely slow or no service at all because of the mobile network
straining to meet iPhone users’ demand [5]. The company switched from unlimited traffic
plans to tiered pricing for mobile data users in summer 2010. Similarly, Dutch T-Mobile’s
infrastructure has not been able to cope with intense data traffic, thus forcing the company
to issue refunds for affected users [6].
Another important aspect is that of mobile security. Around a billion of people today
have their personal information on Facebook and half of them access Facebook from their
mobile phone [7]; the size of the online-banking in America has almost doubled since
2004, with 16% of the American mobile users conducting financial-related activities from
their mobile device [8]; on 2010, customers spent one billion of dollars buying products
on Amazon via mobile devices [9]. These numbers give an idea of the amount of people
that today could find themselves in trouble by not giving enough care into protecting their
mobile device from unauthorized access. A distracted user who loses his phone, or just
forgets it in a public place, even if for a short time only, could allow someone else to get
unrestrained access to his online identity. By copying the contents of the phone, including
passwords and access keys, an attacker could steal money from the user’s bank account,
read the user’s emails, steal the user’s personal files stored on the cloud, use the user’s
personal information to conduct scams, frauds, and other crimes using his name and so on.
But identity theft is not the only security problem affecting mobile users. Between
2011 and 2012, the number of unique viruses and malwares targeting mobile devices has
increased more than six times, according to a recent report [10]. Typically, these try to get
installed in the target device by convincing the user to download an infected app, or by
making them follow a link to a malicious web site.
The problems just exposed are major issues affecting user’s experience nowadays. We
believe that finding effective, yet simple and widely adoptable solutions may require a new
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point of view, a shift in the way these problems are tackled. For these reasons, we evaluated
the possibility of using a hybrid approach, that is, one where different technologies are
brought together to create new, previously unexplored solutions.
We started by considering the issues affecting the mobile network infrastructure. While
it is true that the usage of mobile connectivity has significantly increased over the past
few years, it is also true that socially close users tend to be interested in the same content,
like, the same Youtube videos, the same application updates, the same news and so on. By
knowing that, operators, instead of spending billions [11] to update their mobile network,
could try an orthogonal approach and leverage an ad-hoc wireless network between the
mobile devices, referred to in literature as Pocket Switched Networks [12]. Indeed, most
of the smartphones on the market today are equipped with short-ranged radio interfaces
(i.e., Bluetooth, WiFi) that allow them to exchange data whenever they are close enough to
each other. Popular data could be then stored and transferred directly between devices in
the same social context in an ad-hoc fashion instead of being downloaded multiple times
from the mobile network. We therefore studied the possibility of channeling traffic to a
few, socially important users in the network called VIP delegates, that can help distribut-
ing contents to the rest of the network. We evaluated VIP selection strategies that are based
on the properties of the social network between mobile devices users. In Chapter 2, through
extensive evaluations with real and synthetic traces, we show the effectiveness of VIP del-
egation both in terms of coverage and required number of VIPs – down to 7% in average of
VIPs are needed in campus-like scenarios to offload about 90% of the traffic. These results
have also been presented in [1].
Next we moved to the security issues. On of the highest threats to the security of mo-
bile users is that of an identity theft performed using the data stored on the device. The
problem highlighted by this kind of attacks is that the most commonly used authentication
mechanisms completely fail to distinguish the honest user from somebody who just hap-
pens to know the user’s login credentials or private keys. To be resistant to identity theft
attacks, an authentication mechanism should, instead, be built to leverage some intrinsic
and difficult to replicate characteristic of each user. We proposed the Personal Marks and
Community Certificates systems with this aim in mind. They constitute an authentication
mechanism that uses the social context sensed by the smartphone by means of Bluetooth
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or WiFi radios as a biometric way to identify the owner of a device. Personal Marks is a
simple cryptographic protocol that works well when the attacker tries to use the stolen cre-
dentials in the social community of the victim. Community Certificates works well when
the adversary has the goal of using the stolen credentials when interacting with entities that
are far from the social network of the victim. When combined, these mechanisms pro-
vide an excellent protection against identity theft attacks. In Chapter 3 we prove our ideas
and solutions with extensive simulations in both simulated and real world scenarios—with
mobility traces collected in a real life experiment. This study appeared in [2].
Another way of accessing the private data of a user, other than getting physical access
to his device, could be by means of a malware. An emerging trend in the way people are
fooled into installing malware-infected apps is that of exploiting existing trust relationships
between socially close users, like those between Facebook friends. In this way, the malware
can rapidly expand through social links from a small set of infected devices towards the rest
of the network. In our quest for hybrid solutions to the problem of malware spreading in
social networks of mobile users we developed a novel approach based on the Mobile Cloud
Computing paradigm. In this new paradigm, a mobile device can alleviate the burden
of computationally intensive tasks by offloading them to a software clone running on the
cloud. Also, the clones associated to devices of users in the same community are connected
in a social peer-to-peer network, thus allowing lightweight content sharing between friends.
CloudShield is a suite of protocols that provides an efficient way stop the malware spread
by sending a small set of patches from the clones to the infected devices. Our experiments
on different datasets show that CloudShield is able to better and more efficiently contain
malware spreading in mobile wireless networks than the state-of-the-art solutions presented
in literature. These findings (which are not included in this dissertation) appeared in [3] and
are the result of a joint work with P.h.D student S. Kosta from Sapienza University. My
main contribution to this work was in the simulation of both the malware spreading and of
the patching protocol schemes on the different social networks datasets.
The Mobile Cloud Computing paradigm seems to be an excellent resource for mobile
systems. It alleviates battery consumption on smartphones, it helps backing up user’s data
on-the-fly and, as CloudShield proves, it can also be used to find new, effective, solutions
to existing problems. However, the communication between the mobile devices and their
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clones needed by such paradigm certainly does not come for free. It costs both in terms
of bandwidth (the traffic overhead to communicate with the cloud) and in terms of energy
(computation and use of network interfaces on the device). Being aware of the issues that
heavy computation or communication can cause to both the battery life of the devices [13],
and to the mobile infrastructure, we decided to study the actual feasibility of both mobile
computation offloading and mobile software/data backups in real-life scenarios. In our
study we considered two types of clones: The off-clone, whose purpose is to support com-
putation offloading, and the back-clone, which comes to use when a restore of user’s data
and apps is needed. In Chapter 5 we give a precise evaluation of the feasibility and costs
of both off-clones and back-clones in terms of bandwidth and energy consumption on the
real device. We achieved this by means measurements done on a real testbed of 11 Android
smartphones and on their relative clones running on the Amazon EC2 public cloud. The
smartphones have been used as the primary mobile by the participants for the whole ex-
periment duration. This study has been presented in [4] and is the result of a collaboration
with P.h.D. Student S. Kosta from Sapienza University. S. Kosta mainly contributed to the
experimental setup, deployment of the testbed and data collection.
11
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Pocket Switched
Networks And Properties of Human
Mobility
The rapid growth of the market of mobile devices that has characterized the latest years
has given rise to a very prolific research field of the so-called Pocket Switched Networks
(PSNs), or, more generally, mobile social networks. These are networks composed of mo-
bile devices communicating in an opportunistic manner by means of short-range radios
like Bluetooth or WiFi. In the following chapters, we will see how, by leveraging the well
known properties of the mobile social networks, we will be able to solve important prob-
lems affecting the mobile network infrastructure and the security of mobile users. Here, we
will briefly overview what we believe are some of the most interesting results of this field,
hoping that this will help the reader understand better our work.
1.1 Pocket Switched Networks
A Pocket Switched Network (PSNn) is a distributed wireless network that emerges from the
meeting patterns of people carrying their wireless mobile device (i.e., their smartphone).
PSNs belong to the family of Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) [14]. In Delay Tolerant
Networks, messages usually are sent in a store-and-forward fashion from one node to the
13
other, until the message reaches the intended destination(s). This approach allows to ex-
ploit communication opportunities that last even for few seconds, thus enabling messages
to travel between disconnected, moving portions of the network. In PSNs, the store-and-
forward strategy is adapted to human mobility: wireless communication links are created
and dropped in time, depending on the physical distance of the device holders. Thus, hu-
man mobility creates communicating opportunities that define the very network. Examples
of such network include people in working places, students in university campuses, and
citizens in metropolitan areas.
The body of the research in PSNs can be roughly divided into three parts. First, it has
been necessary to collect data on the meeting patterns of people so as to understand the
main properties of human social behaviour. Then, based on the collected data, a number
of so-called forwarding algorithms have been defined to allow reliable and fast communi-
cation between nodes. Finally, new mobility models have been designed with the aim of
overcoming the limitations affecting the collected data on human mobility.
1.2 Properties of Human Mobility
With the aim of fully understanding the actual feasibility of the model of communication
used in PSNs, researches made numerous efforts in collecting actual data that could shed
a light on the main properties of human social behaviour. These datasets were mostly
collected by means of experiments in which a set of participants were given small Bluetooth
devices (iMotes) able to sense and record their respective presence [12,15]. Many of these
experiments were performed in conference and campus environments with a number of
participants varying between 10 and 90 people, and for a period spanning between few days
and few weeks. Other data was also collected that, however, used information collected by
WiFi access points [16]. This allowed to increase the size of the dataset at the expense of
granularity. Thanks these datasets, researches could give precise characterizations of the
human mobility patterns leveraged by PSNs. Those that attracted the most of the attention
were the inter-contact time, the contact duration and the number of contacts. Together,
these properties characterize the latency before a message reaches the destination and the
amount of data that can be transferred.
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The inter-contact time is defined as the amount of time that passes in-between commu-
nication opportunities. The statistical properties of the inter-contact time of the collected
dataset has been mainly studied by Chaintreau et al. in [17], by Karagiannis et al. in [18]
and by Conan et al. in [19]. Their studies show how the cumulative distribution of the
inter-contact times between all the pair of nodes initially follows a power-law but then de-
cays exponentially. Chaintreau et al. also study the relationship between the exponent of
the power-law distribution and the expected communication delay.
Barabasi et al. in [20], study the trajectory of a very large number of anonymized
mobile phone users whose position is tracked for a six-months period. They observe that
human trajectories show a high degree of temporal and spatial regularity, each individual
being characterized by a time independent characteristic travel distance and a significant
probability to return to a few highly frequented locations. They also show that the proba-
bility density function of individual travel distances are heavy tailed and also are different
for different groups of users and similar inside each group. Furthermore, they plot also the
frequency of visiting different locations and show that it is well approximated by a power
law with an exponential decay.
The duration and the number of contacts, instead, are studied by Hui at al. in [21]. The
authors show how the social relationship between pairs of users can be classified in four
ways according to the number and duration of their contacts. These are friends, strangers,
community and familiar strangers. The first set contains pairs of users having long but not
necessarily frequent contacts; The second group contains people that meet sporadically;
The community of a person, instead, is the set of people that person meets in a regular
way and for long periods of times (e.g., colleagues); Finally, familiar strangers are pair of
people meeting often but for short periods of time.
To further understand the social structure of the nodes, Hui et al. in [22] study how
nodes divide into communities. They first build a contact graph where there edges are
weighted according to either the number of contacts or to the cumulative contact time be-
tween the nodes. Then, they run a number of weighted and unweighted community detec-
tion algorithms [23–25] on them. Finally, they propose distributed algorithms that do not
need to know the whole network topology to accurately detect communities among nodes.
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According to their study, complex community structures emerging from the meetings pat-
terns of the nodes can arise even in small networks.
One last important characteristic of the human social behaviour is the wide heterogene-
ity in the people centrality. Broadly speaking, as observed in all social networks, in mobile
social network people can have different degrees of sociality: There is very popular people,
that meet a great number of people every day, and there is less popular people, that always
meet the same small subset of people. This variety of social behaviour has both a positive
and a negative impact on PSNs. On one side, popular people happen to be very valuable
when it is necessary to send a message to a large set of users. On the other side, not-
so-popular people can sometimes be hard to reach, since they may be available for short
periods of time only during a whole day. In [26] the authors give experimental data on
this matter and show how the number nodes with high centrality is usually very low with
respect to the size of the network. They also show how centrality, as opposite to what one
might think, is not directly correlated to the number of unique nodes met, but, rather, to the
frequency of such contacts.
1.3 Forwarding in PSNs
Achieving reliable and fast communication in PSNs is a hard task. While it is true that, as
discussed in the previous section, the underlying social structure of these network produces
strong regularities in the meeting patterns of the nodes, human mobility has an unpre-
dictable nature that makes end-to-end communication difficult.
In general, in a forwarding algorithm a message follows a multi-hop path from the
source to the intended destination(s). When a node carrying a message meets another
node, it has to decide whether give it a replica of the message or not. To date, Epidemic
Forwarding [27] remains the protocol with the highest performance in terms of success
delivery and delay. The success delivery is defined as the percentage of the sent messages
that are actually delivered to destination before the message timeout. The delay is mea-
sured as the average time of delivery of these messages. Epidemic forwarding is based on
flooding: Upon contact between A and B, node A forwards message m to node B unless
B already has a replica of m. As it can be imagined, this protocol is inefficient in terms of
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message replicas created in the network, and network bandwidth. Further work has been
done in designing efficient and highly performing forwarding protocols for both DTNs and
PSNs. Most of them utilize flooding techniques aiming at approximating the performance
of Epidemic by trying to keep a low cost. Spray and Wait [28] limits the number of copies
to a number specified a-priori and dependent on the environment.
Other forwarding techniques exploit the “probability of delivering” of nodes. Schemes
based on this technique forward messages in a greedy fashion to nodes that are more likely
to meet the destination. One of the most representative protocols in this group is SimBet
Routing [29], where ego-centric centrality of nodes and their social similarity is used to
compute the forwarding quality of a possible relay node. SimBet is very efficient in terms
of message replicas created in the system, but also very well performing: It succeeds in
delivering messages even when there is a unique time-path between nodes. Unfortunately
this routing protocol needs for the nodes to maintain and update routing tables. This make
it unfeasible in PSNs where the movement of the nodes is highly dynamic and very unpre-
dictable.
Delegation Forwarding [30] is another protocol that falls under the same group of pro-
tocols of SimBet. In Delegation Forwarding, each node is given a forwarding quality that
can vary from the overall number of contacts to the time of last contact, and from the con-
tact frequency to the time of last contact with the destination. Similarly, each message is
given a rating that initially matches the forwarding quality of the source node. Upon con-
tact between A and B, every message in A with a rating lower than the forwarding quality
value of B updates its rating to this value. A forwards to B those messages whose rating
is updated, unless B already has a replica. Intuitively, the rating of a replica indicates the
value of the highest quality node that that replica has seen so far. Delegation is shown to
have a very high performance, similar to Epidemic, yet keeping the cost much lower.
Other forwarding protocols for PSNs are based on techniques that exploit social as-
pects of node movement such as being part of a community. One of them is Bubble [21].
This protocol bases its forwarding strategy on the popularity of the individuals within their
communities and within the whole network. Messages are first forwarded to popular nodes
within the network, till they reach the target community. Then, the forwarding continues
within the community through the most popular nodes, until delivery to target nodes.
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Another interesting approach to forwarding is that of SANE, presented in [31]. SANE
is a social aware, stateless forwarding algorithm that exploits people with similar interests,
represented as Interests Profiles (IPs). In the paper, the author show how considering people
with similar interests of the message recipient is a valuable way to quickly and efficiently
route data on PSNs. Moreover, they present a multicast forwarding algorithm that allow
a user to quickly send a message to the set of all the people that may be interested in its
contents.
1.4 Mobility Models
As we already discussed, the whole body of work on the PSNs is based on the data collected
during real-life experiments. Unfortunately, these datasets are often limited in size and
inaccurate. Indeed, collecting real data is an expensive process both in terms of monetary
cost and in terms of the human resources involved (i.e., volunteers). Moreover, hardware
failures and distracted users are often the cause of “holes” in the data that represent a tough
obstacle to researchers. For instance, it is not uncommon for nodes to disappear from the
dataset for long period of times or to report incorrect information. The use of WiFi based
traces partially solves these problems, but introduces many inaccuracies that are not easy
to smooth out [32].
For these reasons, in the past years, the quest for mobility models tailored for the rep-
resentation of the human social behaviour has attracted the attention of many researchers.
The father of these models in undoubtedly the Random Waypoint [33]. In the Random
Waypoint model, nodes move in a squared area by first selecting a uniformly random point
inside the area and then reaching that point at a fixed speed. Needless to say, this model
cannot be used to accurately reproduce the same characteristics of the human contact pat-
terns found in the real datasets. For this reason, Musolesi and Mascolo in [34] proposed
a variation of the Random Waypoint model that leverages a pre-existing social network to
influence the movement of the nodes. More in detail, the probability that a node choses a
given destination is proportional to the amount of friends that are moving towards the same
destination. The main drawback of this model, however, is that it is not clear whether it is
able to reproduce the critical property, observed in real dataset, that the distribution of the
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inter-contact times of all the pair of nodes follow, first, a power law, and then an exponen-
tial distribution. The SWIM mobility model proposed in [35], on the other hand, has been
designed with this aim in mind. Briefly, in the SWIM model, nodes select their destination
according to both the its popularity among the other nodes, and according to the distance
to the “home” of the node. The speed at which the node approaches the destination, then,
is proportional to the distance from the node to the destination. Finally, the amount of time
the nodes wait before selecting the next destination follows a powerlaw distribution. SWIM
has been formally proven to be able to reproduce the inter-contact time characteristics of
the real datasets. Moreover, when tested using on traces generated following the SWIM
model, the most important forwarding algorithms show the same performances they have
on the real datasets.
We consider SWIM the state-of-the-art in the modelling human social behaviour for
PSNs and we will be our reference model for our experiments. Other interesting mobility
models for mobile social networks are those presented in [36–38].
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Chapter 2
Data Offloading in Social Mobile
Networks Through VIP Delegation
Since the modern smartphones have been introduced worldwide, more and more users
have become eager to engage with mobile applications and connected services. This eager-
ness has boosted up sales in the market and, today, smartphones sales are higher than PCs
sales [39]. Simultaneously, smartphone owners are using an increasing number of applica-
tions requiring the transfer of large amounts of data to/from mobile devices. Delay-tolerant
applications related to social networks [40, 41], global sensing [42, 43], and content dis-
tribution [44] are just a few of the examples. As a consequence, the traffic generated by
such devices has caused many problems to mobile network providers, forcing them to stop
selling unlimited data plans [5, 6]. Despite of that, it can be observed that, in the case of
popular data (e.g., news), the redundant traffic on the 3G infrastructure can be drastically
reduced through opportunistic offloading (see Figs. 2.1(a) and 2.1(b)).1
In this chapter, we propose VIP delegation, a solution to this problem based solely
on the inherent social aspects of user mobility. Our idea is to exploit a few, important
subscribers (users) that with their movement and interactions are able to potentially contact
on a regular basis all the rest of the network users. These VIP devices would act as a
bridge between the network infrastructure and the remaining of the network, each time
1There are several other offloading alternatives (through WiFi access points for example, as discussed in
Section 2.1). Here we focus only on the case of opportunistic offloading.
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(a) Pure infrastructure mode. In
this case, the 3G infrastructure
sends the same data to all the
nodes, generating a lot of redun-
dant traffic.
(b) By using opportunistic offloading, it becomes possible to re-
duce redundant traffic sent over the 3G infrastructure. Note that
in this example the 3G infrastructure sent only three copies of the
data (two copies in the beginning and one copy later to cover all
the nodes).
Figure 2.1: Leveraging opportunistic offloading to reduce traffic in 3G networks.
large amount of data has to be transferred. Because nodes move and meet each other, it
suffices to contact a subset of them to reach a large number of nodes (possibly all of them).
In the example of Figure 2.1(b), nodes {x,y} can serve as VIPs on behalf of the others, as
they meet by themselves the rest of the network.
VIP delegation can help alleviate the network traffic in different delay-tolerant scenar-
ios. Collection of urban-sensing related data [42, 43], distribution of content to users by
service providers, and free updates of (lite versions) mobile software’s ad pools are exam-
ples of applications that would directly benefit from the use of VIPs. As these examples
are typical applications that induce large amount of traffic in the network, delegating the
collection/distribution of such traffic to a few important nodes would result in immediate
data offload.
The question here is how to compute an appropriate VIP set given some requirements.
For this, we present, formalize, and evaluate two methods of VIPs selection: global and
neighborhood VIP delegation (see Section 2.2). While the former focuses on users that are
globally important in the network (namely, global VIPs), the latter selects users that are
important within their social communities. The importance of a user within the network
is given in terms of well-known attributes such as centrality (betweenness, degree, and
closeness) and page rank. In both cases, we observe that a short observation period (one
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week) is enough to detect users that keep their importance during long periods (several
months). Selected nodes are then used to cover the network during a certain time window
through solely direct wireless contacts with the remaining nodes (see Section 2.3). In this
chapter, we provide significant extension over a companion work by deeply investigating
coverage aspects [45].
Through extensive evaluations on real-life and synthetic traces, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of the global and neighborhood VIP delegation methods in terms of network cov-
erage, by varying the number of VIPs chosen (see Section 2.5). We compare our solution
with an optimal benchmark computed from the full knowledge of the system. The results
reveal that our strategies get very close to the performance of the benchmark VIPs: Only
5.93% page-rank VIPs against almost 4% of the benchmark VIPs are required to offload
about 90% of the network in campus-like scenarios. Additionally we discuss on possible
VIP incentives, the way VIPs offload the traffic accumulated to the network, and leveraged
applications in Section 2.7. Finally, we conclude with Section 2.8.
The results presented in this chapter appear in [1].
2.1 Network Offloading
So far, the most reasonable solution to alleviate the load on the mobile network infrastruc-
ture is that of offloading to alternate networks, such as femtocells and WiFi. Femtocells
exploit broadband connection to the service provider’s network and leverage the licensed
spectrum of cellular macro-cells to offer better indoor coverage to subscribers [46]. As a
side effect, automatic switching of devices from cellular network to femtocells reduces the
load of the network. Besides from being localized (indoors only), such solution suffers
from the non-proliferation of femtocells to subscribers’ homes. Moreover, charging users
for the necessary equipment as the network providers are currently doing (150 USD for
AT&T’s microcell) will not help in this direction.
On the other hand, the proliferation of modern WiFi enabled smartphones, together
with the network providers’ tendency towards already existing technologies has turn WiFi
offloading into a reality. More and more carriers worldwide are investing in this direc-
tion [47], by installing access points and hot-spots close to overloaded cellular towers, and
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by providing to clients WiFi access within tiered monthly subscription. In this direction,
Balasubramanian et al. propose a system to augment access to 3G network through WiFi
offloading [48]. This system, called Wiffler focuses only on Internet access from moving
vehicles. It leverages delay tolerance and fast switching of devices to overcome the poor
availability and performance of WiFi.
Even though offloading to WiFi seems to be the best solution so far to cellular network
overloading [49], the continuous increasing of mobile data-traffic demand suggests for in-
tegration of WiFi with other offloading methods. Indeed, according to a report released
from CISCO on February 2010 mobile data traffic is growing today 2.4 times faster than
global fixed broadband one [50]. The mobile data consumed annually is expected to reach
40 exabytes by 2014, more than 90% of which will be driven by laptops’ and smartphones’
air cards. As we will show, our solution is essentially different from WiFi and femtocell-
based offloading; nevertheless, it can be integrated to these methods to further help alleviate
mobile data overloads.
To the best of our knowledge, Han et al. were the first to exploit opportunistic communi-
cation between mobile devices to alleviate data traffic in cellular networks [51]. However,
conversely from ours, their solutions only apply to information dissemination problems
such as broadcasting. They focus on selecting k target users to which the information is first
sent through cellular network. These target users will then, through multi-hop opportunistic
forwarding, disseminate the information to all users in the network. Multi-hop forwarding
is not feasible in our scenario where large amount of data is to be transferred: applications
that require collection of sensing data would be costly in terms of energy [42, 43]. More-
over, multi-hop forwarding requires collaboration of all users in the network. Even though
such collaboration can be stimulated by incentive mechanisms [52], there is no guarantee
on packet delivery. Rather, our solution relies on upgrading a crucial small set of users’
devices (down to 5.93% according to experiments with real campus-like data traces), that
through direct contact with network members help alleviate the data traffic in both upload
and download, assuring that no packet is being lost.
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2.2 VIP Delegation in a Nutshell
We propose an offload method based solely on the inherent social aspects of user mobility.
Our idea is to detect subscribers (users) that, with their inherent mobility, are able to en-
counter a large number of users (possibly all them) in a regular fashion. These VIP devices
would act as a bridge between the network infrastructure and the remaining of the network,
each time large amount of data has to be transferred.
As the research in the field of Pocket Switch Networks has shown, our movement ois not
random; rather, it is a manifestation of our social behavior. The analysis of such mobility
patterns and the understanding of how mobile users meet play a critical role at the design
of solutions/services for such kind of networks. Therefore, in general lines, this chapter
investigates the following questions:
• How to gain insights into social mobile networking?
• How to utilize such insights to design solutions allowing alleviating the network
traffic in the current overloaded 3G networks?
In particular, though the number of network users can be very high, just a few of them
have an “important” role within the social graph induced by the encounters. The natural
behavior of these VIP nodes, which are considerably fewer than the rest of the network, can
be a valuable resource in both information dissemination and collection to/from the rest of
the network. Motivated by the fact that opportunities for users to exchange data depend
on their habits and mobility patterns, our idea is the following: turn those few VIP nodes
into bridges between regular users and the Internet, each time large amount of data is to be
uploaded/downloaded by these latter ones. In a word, VIPs would act as delegates of the
network infrastructure builder. As a side effect, this would immediately drop down the 3G
network usage.
In our scenario, we assume that users download/upload large amount of data. This
would demand a lot of networking resources and thus, makes the use of multi-hop proto-
cols unfeasible. Indeed, it is quite hard to convince the average user to act as a relay for
others, even though to the closest access point, of such an overloading traffic. Rather, our
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solution relies on the upgrade of a small, crucial set of VIP nodes that regularly visit net-
work users and collect (disseminate) data to them on behalf of the network infrastructure.
Such upgrade would serve as incentive to users to play the role of VIPs (see Section 2.7
for discussions on possible VIP incentives). When this happens we say that the network is
covered. Similarly, when a VIP visits a user, we say that the user is covered.
Now the problem becomes the following: how to choose the smallest VIP set that
with their natural movement in the network cover potentially all users in a certain time
window?. More formally, the problem is defined as follows: Let N = {n1, . . . ,nn} be the
network nodes and let Gi = (Vi,Ei) be the graph whose set of vertexes Vi ⊂ N are the
network nodes that have at least a meeting during the time window i, whereas the set of
edges Ei represents those meetings, i.e. {u1,u2} ∈ Ei iff u1 and u2 meet in the time window
i. We are looking for S⊂N such that S= argminS⊂N |∪i [(Vi \(S∪{u | {u,s} ∈ Ei,s∈ S})]|.
That is, we are looking for the smallest set of nodes S that dominate most of the network
during the time window i. Note that set S can be seen as the smallest set of vertexes from N
that dominates most of the nodes in each Gi according to the respective Ei. Though it has a
dominating set flavor, this problem is different from it: Indeed, here we deal with a series
of graphs instead of a singular one.
As previously mentioned, we solve this problem by presenting two VIP selection meth-
ods that rely on either a global or a local view of the network (the methods are detailed in
Section 2.3). We also present a benchmark solution for VIP delegation. The benchmark
provides an optimal selection method that (i) requires the complete pre-knowledge of users’
behavior and (ii) is based on an adaptation of the well known NP-hard problem of the Min-
imum Dominating Set [53]. Such a method is clearly not feasible in real-life applications,
but useful to evaluate the goodness of our social-based VIP selection methods.
2.3 VIP selection methods
The selection of VIPs in a social mobile network is based on the ranking of nodes accord-
ing to their social structural attributes and requires knowledge on their mobility. For this, a
social graph describing the tightness of links in the network has to be designed. As the au-
thors of [54] show, the performance of network protocols is strictly related to the goodness
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of the mapping between the mobility process and the network social graph. They propose
an online algorithm that uses concepts from unsupervised learning and spectral graph the-
ory to infer the “correct” graph structure. However, this approach is not applicable in our
case, where VIPs are to be predicted. We thus decide to follow a simpler method in detect-
ing the network’s social graph, based on the following intuition: The movement of users
guided by their interests generates repeatability in their behaviors (e.g., go to work/school
every day, hang out with the same group of friends). Thus, observing users’ movement and
meeting patterns for a short monitoring period reveals enough information to characterize
the tightness of the social links in the network graph.
In a real-life application, we could imagine the network infrastructure builder asking
participating users to log their meetings for a certain time, called here as monitoring period.
These logs serve then to build the networks’ social graph on which the VIPs selection is
made. More specifically, from mobility patterns and wireless interactions of users in a
network, we establish a social undirected graph G(V ;E), where V is the set of users and E
is the set of social ties (encounters) among them. Note that such social graph is different
from each of the Gi = (Vi,Ei) we mentioned in the previous section. Indeed, Gi represents
exactly who meets who in a certain time window i; whereas G is only a representation of
the tightest friendship relations among network nodes that appears during the monitoring
period, which is composed of a set of time windows i. The details of the construction of the
social graph will be given in Section 2.5.3. However, we anticipate that social ties (edges)
in the graph G(V ;E) are strictly related to users’ contact frequency: A link exists between
two users if the number of times they meet is larger than a certain threshold, which depends
on the considered networking scenario.
At the following, we present our global and local VIPs selection methods as well as the
social structural attributes used at nodes ranking.
2.3.1 VIPs selection methods
Global VIP selection: In the global selection, all network nodes are first ordered according
to their importance in the network, determined by their social structural attributes (see
Section 2.3.2). Afterwards, the smallest VIP set over the global social graph that covers
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the network during a certain time window through direct contacts is chosen, by applying
one of the following VIP promotion methods:
• Blind global promotion. It selects the top-ranked nodes not yet promoted, till the
network is covered.
• Greedy global promotion. This is a set-cover flavored solution. In particular, it starts
with promoting to VIP the top-ranked node. After this promotion, the nodes covered
by this VIP are dumped and ranking on the remaining nodes are re-computed. Again,
the procedure is repeated till the network is covered.
Hood VIP selection: The second strategy, neighborhood VIP delegation, is based on the
intuition that repetitive meetings among people happen usually in the same places. The
mobile social network generated by this behavior encompasses, besides contact locality,
well tight social-community sub-structures. With this in mind, the hood strategy aims to
cover each community at a time, independently from other communities. It selects hood
VIPs by their importance within the communities they belong to. Before doing so, we first
detect social-communities using the k-clique community algorithm [23]. The reason behind
this choice is that the k-clique algorithm can detect overlapping communities, i.e., nodes
may appear to belong to more than one community. This characteristic of the k-clique
algorithm makes it well suited for a scenario like ours in which people belong to more than
one social community (e.g. gym members that are also computer science students, etc.).
This is also the reason why the k-clique algorithm is widely used in the area of social mobile
networking [21,26,55]. Finally, to study the overlapping between communities, we use the
Jaccard similarity index [56], which, for two sets A and B is computed as: JA,B =
|A∩B|
|A∪B| .
Afterwards, we rank members of each community according to their importance in the
network (see Section 2.3.2). Then, we start covering each community by promoting its
members to VIPs similarly to the global VIPs methods:
• Blind hood promotion. It continuously selects the top-ranked nodes not yet promoted
in the community, till the network is covered.
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• Greedy hood promotion. The highest-ranked member in the community is promoted,
nodes it covers within the community are dropped, and rankings are computed again
in the remaining graph.
In both promoting ways, when the whole community is covered, the procedure contin-
ues with another one, until all the communities are covered.
2.3.2 Social structural attributes of nodes
We define the importance of a node in the network by applying to the network social graph
several structural attributes: betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, degree centrality,
and Page rank. All these are well-known attributes in social network theory [57, 58]:
Betweenness centrality measures the number of occurrences of a node in the shortest-path
between pairs of others nodes. It thus determines “bridge nodes” that, with their movement,
act as connectors between node groups (communities). For a given node k it is calculated
as: CB(k) = ∑Nj=1
j 6=k
∑Ni=1
i6=k
gi, j(k)
gi, j
, where N is the number of nodes in the network, gi, j is the
total number of shortest paths linking i and j, and gi, j(k) is the number of those shortest
paths that include k.
Degree centrality ranks nodes based on the number of their direct ties (i.e., neighbors) in
the graph. It identifies the most popular nodes, also called hubs in social network theory,
possible conduits for information exchange. Degree centrality is calculated as: CD(k) =
∑Ni=1 a(k, i), where a(k, i) = 1 if k and i are linked, and a(k, i) = 0 otherwise.
Closeness centrality ranks higher nodes with lower multi-hop distance to other nodes of
the graph. It describes “independent nodes” that do not dependent upon others as inter-
mediaries or relayers of messages due to their closeness to other nodes. The closeness
centrality for a node k is calculated as CC(k) = N−1∑Ni=1 d(k,i)
, where d(k, i) is the length of the
shortest path between nodes k and i. To deal with disconnections it is computed within the
subgraph induced by the elements of the connected component to which k belongs.
Page rank, the well known Google’s ranking algorithm, measures the likelihood of nodes
in having important friends in a social graph [58]. In particular, page rank of a node i in the
social graph is given by the equation PR(k) = 1−dN + d∑i∈F(k)
PR(i)
|F(i)| , where d (0 ≤ d ≤ 1)
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Figure 2.2: (a) Meeting between u, v, and w during days 1 and 2. (b)-(d) Rules for the
construction of graph G. (e) Final representation of graph G.
is the damping factor and F(k) is the set of neighbors of k in the social graph (the graph
is undirected). The damping factor d controls the amount of randomness in page ranking:
Values close to 1 will give high page rank to socially best-connected nodes.
2.4 Benchmark approach
To evaluate the efficiency of our strategies, we propose a benchmark approach that gives
the optimal solution: 100% of user coverage in a time window of one day, with minimum
number of VIPs. It is important to underline that the benchmark serves only for comparison
purposes, as it requires knowing the future to compute the exact set of VIPs.
2.4.1 Application scenario’s abstraction
Suppose the network has to be covered daily (i.e., the time window i is of one day) by VIP
delegates, for a period P during which the activity of all network users is known. Let also
P be n days long. We construct a directed graph G = (V,E) through the following rules (a
step-by-step generation of graph G is illustrated in Fig. 2.2):
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Rule 1 Graph G has a vertex ui for each day i in which user u is active (i.e., u has at least
one contact during the day). This vertex impersonates u during day i in G and is referred to
as the clone of u during that day (see Fig. 2.2(a) and 2.2(b)). The set of clones representing
user u in G is denoted as Cu.
Rule 2 For every user u, Cu forms a clique in G, i.e., each pair of clones ui, u j of user u in
G is connected by two directed edges, namely, (ui,u j) and (u j,ui) (see Fig. 2.2(c)).
Rule 3 If users u and v meet on day i, then every member ut of Cu is connected to vi through
an edge (ut ,vi). Similarly, every member vt of Cv is connected to ui through an edge (vt ,ui).
In particular, G also contains edges (vi,ui) and (ui,vi) representing that u and v met on day
i (see Fig. 2.2(d)).
The graph G constructed with the above rules represents users’ behavior in the network
during the whole period P. Take for example a certain user u. According to Rules 1 and 2,
user u is “expanded” in G into a clique Cu, containing clones of u only for the days u is
active (see Fig. 2.2(b) and 2.2(c)). Moreover, if u meets v in day i, Rule 3 guarantees that all
members of Cu point to vi (see Fig. 2.2(d)). The intuition behind this rule is that outgoing
edges from u′s clique indicate that “u can be a delegate for v on day i”.
Rule 3 is applied to every day on which user u is active. As a consequence, all members
of the u′s clique in G point to the same members of other users’ cliques. Thus, any clone
of user u in G (any member of Cu) is enough to determine the set of users v for which u can
be a delegate, and on which days.
2.4.2 Benchmark delegates selection
Intuitively, in order to cover all the network day by day, it is enough to select as delegates
the members of a minimum out-dominating set of graph G. Moreover, such a set of dele-
gates is the smallest set that can achieve full coverage. The following theorems prove such
intuition.
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Theorem 1 Let MDS be a minimum out-dominating set of G. The set MDS can cover
100% of the active users for each day i ∈ P.
Proof 1 First recall that according to Rule 2, the set Cu of clones of a same user u form a
clique in G. Since MDS is minimum, it contains at most one clone for every user u. When
members of such a set are promoted to delegates, we get at most one delegate-instance per
user.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that user v is active during day i, i.e., vi ∈ G. As
MDS is a dominating set, either of the following cases might happen: (i) some clone vt of
v is in MDS or (ii) there is at least one other node u’s clone ul ∈MDS such that the edge
(ul,vi) is in G. In case (i), since vt ∈ MDS, v is promoted to a delegate and is covered
by itself. Case (ii) can only happen if edge (ul,vi) was added by Rule 3, i.e., u and v met
during day i. Given that ul ∈ MDS, u is promoted to a delegate. Thus, v is necessarily
covered on day i.
Theorem 2 Let MDS be a minimum out-dominating set of G. Let also S be the smallest
set of VIP delegates able to cover, for every day i ∈ P, 100% of the active network users on
day i. Then, |MDS| ≤ |S|.
Proof 2 Suppose, on the contrary, that |S| < |MDS|. By construction, and with a similar
reasoning used in the proof of Theorem 1 it is easy to see that S is an out-dominating set of
G. Then, by the minimum cardinality of MDS, we are done.
The above theorems indicate how to proceed to find the best possible solution to our
problem: after constructing graph G according to Rules 1, 2, and 3, find a minimum out-
dominating set of G and use the members of such set as benchmark VIP delegates.
The minimum dominating set is notably a NP-hard problem. Thus, to individuate our
benchmark VIP delegates, we reduce our problem to Set Cover (equivalent to MDS under
L-reductions [53]) for which a simple greedy algorithm is known to be only a logarithmic
approximation factor away from the optimum [53]. Moreover, the innaproximability result
for this problem shows that no polynomial algorithm can approximate better than (1−
o(1)) logn unless NP has quasi-polynomial algorithms. Thus, there is no polynomial-time
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Table 2.1: Details on the datasets and respective monitoring period.
Data set Taxi Dartmouth SWIM-500 D-SWIM-1500 A-SWIM-1500
Total nodes 536 1142 500 1500 1500
AVG active nodes/day (trace) 491 1060 499.98 1500 1500
AVG active nodes/day (monitoring) 429 1061.5 500 1500 1500
AVG contacts/node/day (trace) 7804 292 128 130 380
AVG contacts/node/day (monitoring) 7656 284 131 129 378
algorithm with a smaller approximation factor. The delegates obtained by this heuristic are
then used as benchmark VIPs in our experiments.
2.5 Experimental setting: From data-sets to social graphs
We now give detailed information on the data-sets (real and synthetic) we use in the evalu-
ation of our strategies.
2.5.1 Real data-sets
Two real data-sets are used: Dartmouth [59] (movement of students and staff in a college
campus) and Taxis [60] (movement of taxi cabs in San Francisco). The vehicular mobility
of the cabs is different from human mobility (Dartmouth). However, the purpose of using
the taxis trace is to test our solution’s extendibility to different contexts.
Dartmouth. Dartmouth includes SNMP logs from the access points across the Dartmouth
College campus from April 2001 to June 2004. To generate user-to-user contacts from the
data-set, we follow the popular consideration in the literature that devices associated to the
same AP at the same time are assumed to be in contact [61]. We consider activities from
the 5th of January to the 6th of March 2004, corresponding to a 2-month period during
which the academic campus life is reasonably consistent. We chose to work with the set of
nodes that have a fairly stable activity in time: at least 500 contacts per week with any other
device. This results in a set of 1,146 nodes with an average of 1,060 daily active devices
and 292 daily contacts in average per device.
Taxis. The Taxi data-set contains GPS coordinates of 536 cabs collected over 24 days
33
in San Francisco. Here, we assume that two cabs are in contact when their geographical
distance is smaller than 250 m (following suggestions of Piorkowski et al. [60]). This yields
an average of 491 active nodes per day and 7,804 daily contacts per node.
2.5.2 Synthetic data-sets
Synthetic traces are generated using the SWIM model [62], shown to simulate well human
mobility from statistical and social points of view. We use SWIM to simulate a 500-node
version of the Cambridge Campus data-set (of only 36 Bluetooth enabled iMotes, 11 days
long) [62]. We call this trace SWIM-500. It simulates user activity during 2 months,
yielding 128 daily contacts per node in average. Then, we scale up to 1,500 nodes in two
ways: (i) by keeping density constant (D-SWIM-1500) and (2) by keeping the area constant
(A-SWIM-1500). The purpose of the two different scalings is to study the behavior of our
strategies in two scenarios: D-SWIM-1500 simulates an urban growing in both area and
population and A-SWIM-1500 refers to a sudden over-population of a given city.
Table 2.1 summarizes the details of the data-sets. Note that, although both data-sets
represent campus scenarios, they yield different activity per node per day as they used
distinct technologies (WiFi capable APs in Dartmouth and Bluetooth-like characteristics in
SWIM) in the two data-sets.
2.5.3 Monitoring period and social graph
As we have already discussed in Section 2.3, we observe nodes encounters during an obser-
vation/monitoring period and exploit repeatability of users’ movement patterns and recur-
rence of contacts among them. The used length of the monitoring period is not casual: It is
as short as 1 week and divided in time windows of 1 day. Usually, our life and the activities
we conduct are organized on a week-base, mostly having a common routine repeated day
by day (e.g., go to work/school or have lunch in the same place). Such repetition also infers
the common meetings generated by those activities.
In the case of the Taxi data-set, the repeatability of contacts is due to several factors in-
cluding the popularity of geographical zones in the city (e.g., center, stations, and airports),
the fixed tracks leading to such zones, and the common city areas covered by groups of
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taxis. As shown by Piorkowski et al., popularity of areas generates clusters of connectivity
among cabs [60]. Taxis’ movements are guided by clients’ (humans) necessity to reach a
specific geographic location. Thus, one week observation is again enough to predict future
meetings.
Our intuition on the length of the monitoring period is also confirmed by the results
shown in Table 2.1. Indeed, the properties of the monitoring period are very close to the
whole trace, for each considered scenario. Hence, this makes prediction of future meetings
easy: the monitoring period we have chosen allows us characterizing social relationships.
We are then able to generate a social graph, where two users are connected only if they
have met with a certain frequency – that we call social connectivity threshold – during the
monitoring period. The social connectivity threshold depends on the scenario considered:
• In the Dartmouth data-set, social connectivity in mostly due to the frequentation of
the same classes, or studying in the same library, or living in the same dormitory.
All these activities generate lots of meetings among people. We thus set the social
connectivity threshold in this case to be at least 1 contact per day, for at least 5 days
during a week.
• The social connectivity threshold in the Taxi data-set is higher due to higher speeds:
at least 8 contacts per day during the monitoring period were considered.
• As the SWIM-500 trace also represents a University campus, we use the same social
connectivity threshold of the Dartmouth trace: at least 1 contact per day for at least 5
days of the monitored week. This leads to a set of 498 nodes. When scaling up with
constant density (D-SWIM-1500) the social connectivity threshold remains constant.
It increases to at least 8 contacts per day for at least 5 days of the monitored week
when scaling up with constant area (A-SWIM-1500).
The social graphs generated by the social connectivity thresholds are then used to indi-
viduate the VIP delegates, according to each of the strategies of Section 2.3.
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2.5.4 Community detection
Our hood VIPs selection strategies operate on a community basis and aim at covering single
communities by selecting members that are important within each community.
After applying the k-clique algorithm [23] to determine the communities and with re-
spect to the campus-like scenarios, we have the following parameters: the Dartmouth data
set has 24 communities of 41 members in average, the SWIM-500 trace has 16 communi-
ties with 32 members in average, the D-SWIM-1500 trace has 39 communities with 39.6
members in average, and the A-SWIM-1500 has 35 communities with 44 members in av-
erage. Note that constant-area scaling yields less, bigger communities.
The communities are well-knit and do not show much intersection between them. In-
deed, the average Jaccard similarity index [56] between intersecting communities is 0.038
in the Dartmouth case and about 0.025 in SWIM-500 and D-SWIM-1500 case. This re-
sult supports recent findings on universities’ communities detected with the k-clique algo-
rithm [26]. Conversely, in the constant-area scaling of A-SWIM-1500, the communities
have a higher overlapping: the Jaccard similarity index in this case is 0.045.
The Taxi data-set, due to the large number of contacts and the high mobility of nodes,
does not present any community sub-structuring. When applying the k-clique algorithm,
we observe one huge community containing almost 80% of the nodes, whereas the remain-
ing 20% do not belong to any community. Thus, we decided to apply only the global VIP
selection strategies to this trace.
2.6 Experimental Results
We analyze the performance of all our strategies in terms of coverage when applied to
real and synthetic traces. For better understanding the quality of the VIPs selected by each
strategy, we investigate the coverage trend with regard to an increasing number of the VIPs.
The set used for coverage is updated from time to time following the order in which each
strategy selects VIPs. For the sake of comparison, the results for the benchmark (“Bn”)
are included in the plots. We use the same technique as above to build the benchmark’s
trend: updating the VIPs set and the corresponding network coverage, following the order
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Figure 2.3: Performance of the selection strategies on the Dartmouth data-set. “Bn” refers
to the benchmark, “PR” to the page-rank, “BW” to betweenness centrality, “DG” to degree
centrality, and “CL” to closeness centrality.
in which the benchmark promotes nodes to VIPs. For the page rank attribute, we noted that,
varying the damping factor in the interval [0.51;0.99] does not change the performance of
page rank VIPs with respect to the VIPs selected according to other centralities. However,
we decided to use d = 0.85, since, for page rank, it results in the best performance in terms
of network coverage.
2.6.1 Results with real data-sets: Dartmouth case
Blind promotion. We show in Fig. 2.3 the coverage obtained by each of the promotion
strategies. The blind promotion in the global and hood VIP selection strategies yields the
results presented in Fig. 2.3(a) and 2.3(b). Notice that there is a coverage efficiency gap
between page rank VIPs (referred as “PR” in the figure) and those of other centralities (re-
ferred as “BW”, “DG”, and “CL”). In addition, page rank is very close to the benchmark,
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of VIPs per social attribute on the Dartmouth data-set with the
blind global promotion strategy. The x-axis represents different communities detected.
even for small percentages of delegates considered. For instance, in the global blind strat-
egy, to get to 90% of coverage, page rank only requires the promotion of 5.93% of nodes as
delegates against 3.92% with the benchmark approach (see Table 2.2). Another considera-
tion to be made is that hood selection is more effective than global selection. Hence, aiming
to cover the network by forcing VIP selection within different communities seems to be a
very good strategy. Nevertheless, there exist social attributes such as page rank that do not
gain much from the hood selection. Indeed, global and hood page rank VIPs perform very
similarly in both data-sets. This is because, on the one hand, page rank VIPs already target
different communities, even in the global case. On the other hand, betweenness, degree,
and closeness centrality tend to over-select VIPs from a few network communities, and
consequently, leave uncovered many marginal ones. The tendency of these social attributes
to target only a few communities is attenuated with the hood selection that boosts their
efficiency in covering the network. In Fig. 2.4, we show how the global strategy distributes
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Table 2.2: VIP sets cardinality to get 90% coverage on Dartmouth. The benchmark needs
3.92% of nodes.
G-Blind (%) H-Blind (%) G-Greedy (%) H-Greedy (%)
PR 8.98 6.89 5.93 6.19
BW 15.96 9.16 8.98 6.19
DG 26.96 15.09 5.93 6.19
CL 47.993 26.0035 5.93 6.19
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of VIPs per social attribute on the Dartmouth data-set with the
greedy global promotion strategy. The x-axis represents different communities detected.
VIPs among communities of different centralities.
Greedy promotion. When applying the greedy promotion, the performance of all strategies
improves considerably (see Figs. 2.3(c) and 2.3(d)). In addition, VIPs obtained with each
social attribute perform very similarly to each other, in both hood and global selections.
This is due to the capacity of the greedy approach to not promote as VIPs nodes that are
too close to each other in the social graph. Indeed, after every node’s promotion to VIP,
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Figure 2.6: Performance of blind global and greedy global selection strategies on the Taxi
data-set. “Bn” refers to the benchmark, “PR” to the page-rank, “BW” to betweenness
centrality,“DG” to degree centrality, and “CL” to closeness centrality.
all its neighbors in the social graph and their links are removed. Since communities are
very well tight, the promotion of one member can remove a large part of the community
(if not all of it). Thus, attributes such as betweenness and closeness do not concentrate
their selection on a few communities as in the global selection. This is also confirmed by
Fig. 2.5, where we show how the greedy strategy distributes VIPs among communities for
different social attributes.
2.6.2 Results with real data-sets: Taxi case
As discussed in Section 2.5.4, the community sub-structuring of the Taxi data-set is flat.
This means that, due to the high mobility of nodes, a huge unique community containing
80% of nodes is detected and the 20% remaining nodes do not belong to any community.
Thus, only the global selection strategy is applicable to this data-set. Fig. 2.6 shows the
performance of blind and greedy global selection strategies in terms of coverage for the
Taxi data-set. As we can see, due to the high mobility of nodes, all strategies perform
very well in this scenario. Moreover, the sets selected by each strategy to guarantee up to
90% of coverage are exactly of the same (small) size: Only 0.93% of network nodes. The
benchmark guarantees the same coverage with 0.2% of network nodes selected.
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Figure 2.7: Performance of (a)-(c) blind global and (d)-(f) blind hood selection on SWIM.
“Bn” refers to the benchmark, “PR” to the page-rank, “BW” to betweenness centrality,
“DG” to degree centrality, and “CL” to closeness centrality.
2.6.3 Results with synthetic data-sets: SWIM
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, starting from SWIM-500 (a 500-node simulation of a Uni-
versity scenario [63]), we generate two scaled versions with 1,500 nodes: D-SWIM-1500
(constant density scaling) and A-SWIM-1500 (constant area scaling). Our purpose is to
study the reaction of the different strategies in two cases: an urban growing in both area
and population (constant density) and a sudden over-population of a city (constant area).
We start from blind promotion (see Fig. 2.7). Again, like in the Dartmouth scenario,
page rank VIPs are more efficient than VIPs of other centralities. The reason is the same as
discussed in the previous section, i.e., page rank global VIPs are better distributed within
communities with respect to VIPs obtained with other centralities. For instance, Fig. 2.9
shows such distribution for the trace D-SWIM-1500 (the traces SWIM-500 and A-SWIM-
1500 show a similar trend). Once again, aiming to cover the network by forcing VIPs to
fall in different communities (hood selection) is a winning strategy.
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Figure 2.8: Performance of (a)-(c) greedy global and (d)-(f) greedy hood selection on
SWIM. “Bn” refers to the benchmark, “PR” to the page-rank, “BW” to betweenness cen-
trality, “DG” to degree centrality, and “CL” to closeness centrality.
Results related to greedy promotion are presented in Fig. 2.8. As in the Dartmouth case,
the performance of all strategies is boosted up by the greedy selection of VIPs, yielding a
better distribution of delegates within communities (see Fig. 2.10) and thus, much better
coverage results with respect to the blind promotion. What is interesting to notice here
is the impact of the way of scaling in our strategies. When passing from SWIM-500 to
D-SWIM-1500 (constant density), all strategies perform very similarly in both blind and
greedy promotions. Conversely, in an emergency situation where the network is suddenly
much more overloaded as a result of the over-population of the network area (A-SWIM-
1500), our strategies perform even better (see Fig. 2.7(c), 2.7(f), 2.8(c), and 2.8(f)). This
is also confirmed by the results shown in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 that contain, for each
data-set, the percentage of delegates needed by the different strategies to cover 90% of the
network.
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of VIPs per social attribute on the D-SWIM-1500 data-set with
the blind global promotion strategy. The x-axis represents different communities detected.
Table 2.3: Delegates given by each strategy to get 90% coverage on SWIM-500. The
benchmark approach needs 7.4%.
G-Blind (%) H-Blind (%) G-Greedy (%) H-Greedy (%)
BW 21 14 9 10.6
CL 48 25.4 12.8 11.6
DG 23 13.6 8 8.8
PR 10.8 10.2 9.8 9.6
2.6.4 Coverage potential
To complete our study, we investigate the coverage potential of the first 10% of nodes pro-
moted to delegates according to each strategy. To this end, we measure, for each delegate,
the ratio of non-delegates neighbors on the social graph (i.e., the number of non-delegates
neighbors of delegate i over the total number of neighbors in the social graph). We average
then the result over the set of all delegates chosen by the corresponding strategy. Intuitively,
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of VIPs per social attribute on the D-SWIM-1500 data-set with
the greedy global promotion strategy. The x-axis represents different communities de-
tected.
Table 2.4: VIP sets cardinality to get 90% coverage on D-SWIM-1500. The benchmark
approach needs 7.06%.
G-Blind (%) H-Blind (%) G-Greedy (%) H-Greedy (%)
BW 22 17.26 9 9.93
CL 59 42.06 12.93 11.6
DG 24 17.2 8 9.06
PR 10.9333 10.06 9 9.93
the bigger this value, the larger the coverage potential of the strategy, and vice-versa. In
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 we present the results for every strategy/social attribute for respectively
the Dartmouth and Taxi traces. As a representative of the SWIM traces, on Table 2.8 we
show the results obtained on D-SWIM-1500, since, being the least dense of the synthetic
traces, it is the most interesting for the study of the coverage potential.
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Table 2.5: VIP sets cardinality to get 90% coverage on A-SWIM-1500. The benchmark
approach needs 2.53%.
G-Blind (%) H-Blind (%) G-Greedy (%) H-Greedy (%)
BW 10 6.73 4 4.4
CL 30 11.6 9 6.06
DG 7 5.13 4 3.53
PR 5 4.33 6 4.4
Table 2.6: Coverage potential for each strategy on Dartmouth. The benchmark’s potential
is 0.91.
G-Blind H-Blind G-Greedy H-Greedy
PR 0.830 0.069 1.0 0.831
BW 0.657 0.067 1.0 0.969
DG 0.530 0.061 1.0 0.890
CL 0.144 0.059 1.0 0.886
Table 2.7: Coverage potential for each strategy on TAXI. The benchmark’s potential is
0.96.
G-Blind G-Greedy
PR 0.760 1.0
BW 0.758 1.0
DG 0.742 1.0
CL 0.745 1.0
Note that in the global blind selection, page-rank is the one with the highest value,
followed by betweenness, degree, and finally closeness. This again supports the results
of Fig. 2.3(a). The potential falls drastically when considering the hood blind selection
(second column of Table 2.6): delegates are forced to be in the same community, in a blind
way. Thus, with high probability, they are socially connected with each other. However,
page rank remains the attribute with the highest value, supporting the results of Fig. 2.3(b).
The global greedy selection naturally yields the highest coverage potential for every
attribute: after each node promotion, its neighbors are eliminated from the graph; thus,
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Table 2.8: Coverage potential for each strategy on D-SWIM-1500. The benchmark’s po-
tential is 0.99.
G-Blind H-Blind G-Greedy H-Greedy
PR 0.888 0.558 1.0 0.992
BW 0.688 0.451 1.0 0.993
DG 0.607 0.288 1.0 0.994
CL 0.180 0.094 1.0 0.993
the ratio of non-delegate neighbors of a node is 1. The hood greedy selection (fourth col-
umn of Tables 2.6 and 2.8) leads to smaller values. This is because selection is done on
a community basis and only community neighbors are eliminated after promotion. Since
communities are not totally distinct, it might happen that two VIP neighbors in the social
graph belong to different communities and, consequently, are eliminated after the promo-
tion, decreasing thus the coverage potential of the strategy. This effect is smaller for high
betweenness nodes: they tend to belong to the same group of communities (the ones that
they connect). Closeness/degree attributes suffer less from this effect, as they select nodes
that are central to communities. Finally, page rank is the one that suffers most: high page
rank nodes are well distributed within the community to which they belong (being commu-
nities well-knit). Thus, they are more likely to have high page rank neighbors belonging to
other communities (that the hood greedy selection does not eliminate).
It is worth to note that the coverage potential just gives a hint on the real coverage power
of a method: It does not affect the real ability of the selection method/attribute in covering
the network. Indeed, for all traces (see Tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8) the coverage power of the
benchmark in all traces is less than all the values related to the global greedy selection.
Regardless of the coverage potential, the benchmark performs better with respect to every
strategy. In addition, the results with 90% coverage presented in Tables 2.2–2.5, confirm
page ranks’s high performance ability when combined with every strategy.
2.6.5 Coverage stability
Finally, we investigate the stability of coverage of our strategies in time. We focus on the
delegates set needed to reach, in average, 90% coverage for each strategy on all tracers. In
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Figure 2.11: Coverage stability in time for all strategies (Dartmouth data-set).
Fig. 2.11 and 2.12, we plot the coverage per day of the Dartmouth and D-SWIM-1500 data
sets. We observe that coverage is quite constant in time for every strategy. This reinforces
our intuition on both the monitoring period and the way the social graph is generated.
With minimal information on the scenario and a very short observation of the network, our
strategies are able to compute VIP sets that are small, efficient, and stable in time. The
results we obtained with the Taxi, SWIM and A-SWIM-1500 confirm these results.
2.6.6 Coverage intervals vs. VIPs
The VIPs selected by our strategies are expected to cover all nodes every day of the data-
trace by carrying data traffic from/to the users. All our target applications (e.g., urban-
sensing related data, software updates) are delay-tolerant and would not suffer from the
1-day latency of the daily coverage of VIPs. But what happens for applications that require
coverage intervals different from 1-day? How does the length of the coverage interval
47
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
Co
ve
ra
ge
Day
PR
BW
DG
CL
(a) Blind global
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
Co
ve
ra
ge
Day
PR
BW
DG
CL
(b) Greedy global
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
Co
ve
ra
ge
Day
PR
BW
DG
CL
(c) Blind hood
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
Co
ve
ra
ge
Day
PR
BW
DG
CL
(d) Greedy hood
Figure 2.12: Coverage stability in time for all strategies (D-SWIM-1500 data-set).
Table 2.9: VIP sets cardinality to get 90% coverage on D-SWIM-1500. The benchmark
approach needs 13%. Half-day coverage interval.
G-Blind (%) H-Blind (%) G-Greedy (%) H-Greedy (%)
BW 30 25.53 15 15.63
CL 70 56.33 15 15.69
DG 34 28.66 15 15.65
PR 18 17.46 15 15.6
impact the selection of VIPs? Clearly, if the coverage interval is longer, the 1-day coverage
VIPs are a superset of the required number of delegates. Indeed, for a coverage interval
long e.g. 2 days, the 1-day coverage VIPs would perform as good as in the 2-day coverage
case. However, if the coverage interval required is smaller, the VIP set required to cover
the network is likely to change. To quantify such change we have also studied the half-
day network coverage for all the traces. For both the Taxi and the A-SWIM-1500 traces
we noted absolutely no difference from the 1-day coverage case. We believe this is due
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Figure 2.13: Performance of the selection strategies on the D-SWIM-1500 data-set. “Bn”
refers to the benchmark, “PR” to the page-rank, “BW” to betweenness centrality, “DG” to
degree centrality, and “CL” to closeness centrality. Half-day coverage interval.
to the high mixing and speed of movement of cabs in the Taxi case, and due to the high
node density in the A-SWIM-1500 trace. Recall that A-SWIM-1500 is obtained scaling
SWIM-500 with constant area.
In Dartmouth, SWIM-500 and D-SWIM-1500 we observed a growth in the VIPs num-
ber required to assure 90% of network coverage. Intuitively, this is because the meeting
patterns of the first half of the day are different from those of the second half. The growth
on the number of delegates required to cover 90% of the network in the half-day coverage
case is also reflected in the benchmark’s VIPs, which are almost doubled with respect to the
1-day coverage interval case (see Table 2.9). Hence, one would expect that the same should
happen also with the VIP sets selected by our strategies. However, this is not the case. For
instance, from the comparison of the 1-day coverage interval results with the D-SWIM-
1500 dataset of Table 2.4 with the half-day coverage interval results with the same dataset
49
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
Co
ve
ra
ge
Day
PR
BW
DG
CL
(a) Blind global
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
Co
ve
ra
ge
Day
PR
BW
DG
CL
(b) Greedy global
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
Co
ve
ra
ge
Day
PR
BW
DG
CL
(c) Blind hood
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
Co
ve
ra
ge
Day
PR
BW
DG
CL
(d) Greedy hood
Figure 2.14: Coverage stability in time for all strategies (D-SWIM-1500 data-set). Half-
day coverage interval.
of Table 2.9 we note that the VIP sets have increased of about 60%. This again means that
selecting VIPs according to their “importance” in the network is a good strategy: Indeed,
most of the important people during the morning remain so also during evening. However,
the coverage interval length indeed does impact the cardinality of VIPs. This suggests for
application developers or network infrastructure builders to trade off between data transfer
frequency and number of VIPs.
To conclude, Fig. 2.13 and 2.14 show respectively the coverage trend, and the perfor-
mance of the different selection strategies for the case of half-day interval coverage. Again
we note that page-rank wins over the other centralities, and the hood selection strategy wins
over the global selection one. Finally, Fig. 2.14 confirms the stability in time of our VIPs,
regardless of the length of the coverage interval.
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2.7 Incentivizing VIPs and data transfer
Being the human nature inherently selfish, it is more likely that no user would accept the
promotion to VIP. However, the number of VIPs selected by our strategies to guarantee
90% coverage is quite low (8% in SWIM, 5.93% in Dartmouth, less than 1% in Taxi). In
view of this, VIPs could have their devices upgraded to more fancy, recent ones, and get
paid for carrying them around and "working" for the network provider/application builder.
Considering the amount of funding that Governments worldwide are putting into global-
sensing research [64–66] this incentive is more than real. Another possibility involves
considering users’ traffic load at the delegates selection and use it to establish a maximum
load threshold per delegate. Accordingly, combine it with the social attributes for delegate
selection considering fairness and resource constraint among delegates.
It is clear that cellular networks cannot handle the data-traffic from/to VIPs in the classic
way (whenever VIPs like), because it would not be of any benefit to offloading. However,
the 3G network can still be used in different moments of the day to transfer the data. So, the
network load would result distributed in time rather than concentrated in highly congested
hours. Another possibility is to transfer the data through wired networks, whenever a VIPs
device gets connected to a broadband network during the day. After all, if VIPs are being
paid to perform such task, this assumption is more than reasonable.
Another consideration to be made on our strategies is the following: “How to handle
the traffic of 10% of network users that remain uncovered by our delegates?” As discussed
above, the coverage of 90% of nodes requires the promotion as delegates of very few and
constant in time network members. This confirms the advantage of our opportunistic dele-
gation approach for covering a high percentage of nodes in a daily basis. Additionally, we
claim that the impact of the few 10% non-covered nodes on the 3G network will be small
and typically generated by nodes that are marginal to the network (e.g., people frequent-
ing peripheral areas of a city). Usually, nodes having a high activity or mostly visiting
central areas in the network will be represented in the constructed social graph, stressing
their frequent encounters. In this way, we believe that such more active nodes will be
mostly responsible for the traffic overloading previously mentioned and will be covered by
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the selected delegates, with high probability. Therefore, to answer the previous considera-
tion, the few remaining uncovered nodes could directly transfer their data using 3G cellular
networks, at the end of the day, once no delegate visit was detected.
2.8 Conclusions
Dense metropolitan areas are suffering network overloading due to the data-traffic gener-
ated by the proliferation of smartphone devices. In this chapter, we describe VIP delegation,
a mechanism to alleviate such traffic based on opportunistic contacts. Our solution relies
on the upgrade of a small, crucial set of VIP nodes that regularly visit network users and
collect (disseminate) data to them on behalf of the network infrastructure.
VIPs are defined according to well known social network attributes (betweenness, close-
ness, degree centrality and page-rank), and are selected according to two methods: global
(network-based) and hood (community-based) selection. Our observations reveals that 1
week of monitoring period is enough to characterize the tightness of the social links in
the network graph. Hence, all methods rely on this network monitoring period and select
VIP sets that result small, efficient, and stable in time. Extensive experiments with several
real and synthetic data-sets show the effectiveness of our methods in offloading: VIP sets
of about 7% and 1% of network nodes in respectively campus-like and vehicular mobility
scenarios are enough to guarantee about 90% of network offload. Additionally, the perfor-
mance of the VIPs selected by our methods is very close to an optimal benchmark VIPs set
computed from the full knowledge of the system (i.e., based on past, present, and future
contacts among nodes).
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Chapter 3
Personal Marks and Community
Certificates: Detecting Clones in
Wireless Mobile Social Networks
You have left your smartphone on the table at a cafeteria. You soon realize and go back to
take it. Fortunately, it is still there! You feel safe—while you are not safe at all. Someone
has connected your smartphone to a laptop and dumped all of its memory, including public
and secret cryptographic keys. It is a matter of seconds or, at most, minutes. You do not
revoke your certificates and passwords (you feel safe!) but, a month later, you discover that
your credentials have been used by someone else. If you think this cannot happen—people
take very good care of their personal devices—consider that according to a report 478 lap-
tops have been lost or stolen from the IRS (the Internal Revenue Service is the United States
federal government agency that collects taxes and enforces the internal revenue laws) be-
tween 2002–2006; 112 held sensitive taxpayer data, including SSNs. Furthermore, recent
statistics show that in the United States around a thousand phones are lost every hour [67].
Our idea on how to solve this identity cloning (or identity theft) attack is to leverage
social physical contacts, securely collected by wireless radio equipped personal devices
(e.g., smartphones), as a biometric way to authenticate the owner of the device: Users
prove who they are not with something they know (passwords), or something they have
(certificate), but with an unforgeable proof that they actually meet physically and regularly
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the people they are supposed to meet. Indeed, as the research on Pocket Switched Networks
has proved, our physical contacts are not random. Rather, they are highly influenced by
the fact that almost everything in our everyday life is guided by social relationships (e.g.
friends, family) and interests (e.g. work, school, gym, or playing chess) which yields a
regularity in the communities we live in and in circle of friends that we usually meet in
person.
We will see how to use this regularity, complemented with other essential mechanisms,
to detect the clone attack by using wireless networks of mobile devices and to prevent
the misuse of stolen certificates. We will introduce two protocols: Personal Marks and
Community Certificates. Personal Marks is a simple cryptographic protocol that provides
a way to detect the attack when the adversary is an insider, a person that tries to use the
cloned identity in the social community of the victim. Community Certificates is a solution
based on certificates that tells how the owner of a device is expected to behave in terms
of social contacts. If the adversary is an outsider, someone that wants to use the cloned
identity outside the community of the victim, the certificates soon expire, and the cloned
identity cannot be used anymore.
The results presented in this chapter appear in [2].
3.1 The clone attack
The detection of the clone attack is one of the most investigated security issue in wireless
ad-hoc networks. As far as static wireless networks are concerned, there are three main ap-
proaches to the problem: Centralized, local and distributed random based techniques. The
centralized techniques like [68] require a base station to collect the location information of
the nodes and to check for anomalies (same node ID with different locations). Local-based
schemes like [69] make use of voting mechanisms within nodes’ neighborhoods to detect
clones. Finally, the distributed and random based techniques like [70, 71] require nodes
to send signed location information to randomly selected destinations on the network in
a hop-by-hop fashion. All these techniques, by relying on fixed geographical position of
the nodes in the network are not apt to be used in mobile scenarios such the one we con-
sider [12, 72].
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With the spreading of the mobile pay systems (72.8 million of users at the end of 2009,
expected 220 million by 2011 in China only [73]), and especially those based on credit card
transactions, phone cloning has become a vicious threat to the users portfolio [74]. Thus a
lot of research on detecting such attacks have been done, most of which is based on the use
of neural networks by the carrier to detect possible anomalies. For a good survey see [75].
The use of biometrics to authenticate has become a well-known area of investigation
in computer security. Several biological measurements have been used to identify people
to computer systems: voice, face, iris, keystroke dynamics (the way we type is often suf-
ficiently unique to identify ourselves), and others. As an excellent reference and starting
point on computer biometrics, see [76].
The authors in [77] propose two intrusion detection systems that have similar biomet-
rics ideas: The first one is built upon Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF), whereas the
second one leverages User Mobility Profiles (UMP). However both detection systems are
not distributed, and rely on the fact that the intruder (the clone) behaves substantially dif-
ferently from the real user in terms of geographical movements. Thus, compared with the
solutions proposed by us, both systems are not able to detect anomalies when the clone
behaves similarly to the original node (for example, when the clone attack happens in a
building).
In [78], Chaw et al. propose a framework for authentication based on behavioural infor-
mation collected by a portable device like a smartphone. There are some key differences
with our solution. First, they require an always online Data Aggregator that must be in-
voked during the authentication phase, while our solution is distributed. Second, they need
a Trusted Platform Module to be installed in the device that checks if the device sensing
components have been tampered. Third, they are not able to detect an anomaly when the
adversary is able to reproduce the behaviour of the victim. Finally, they do not leverage the
social characteristics of the user.
In the system presented by Miettinen and Asokan in [79] a device adjusts its access
control policies based on the context in which it resides. If the context, defined as the set of
devices in range, is not familiar to the device, then the device locks itself and asks the user
to type a password or pin to unlock it. On the other hand, if the set of devices in range is
mainly composed of known devices, then the device assumes the environment is safe and
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applies a shallow locking mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first presenting biometric authentication tech-
niques based on the social contacts of the owner of the device to detect the clone attack in
mobile wireless networks of smartphones. The techniques, namely Community Certificates
and Personal Marks, are only built upon the socially-guided meeting patterns of users in
the mobile social network. They are thoroughly orthogonal to trust or voting mechanisms,
or geography based techniques to detect cellphone theft or credit card fraud, that are based
on different ideas and can be used at the same time.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 3.2 we give a detailed
description of our system and of the model of the adversary; In Section 3.3 we describe
the details of the Personal Marks and Community Certificates protocols; In Section 3.5
we show some experimental results; Finally, in Section 3.6 we discuss some interesting
extensions to our system.
3.2 The System
Our network setting is made of last generation smartphones. Smartphones are not-so-small
devices that can easily handle video/audio streaming, 3D games, web surfing and SSL
sessions, and other applications. Therefore, we can safely assume that nodes are able to
perform public key cryptography. The nodes are equipped with public/private key pairs,
and the former is signed by a trusted authority CA.
Nodes are loosely time synchronized. Loose time synchronization is very easy to get,
if a precision in the order of the second is enough, like in our protocols. We also assume
that the trusted authority is able to send a message to any node in the system, for example
using the cellular network. When a clone is present, the message is received by the original
node and by the clone as well (of course it is perfectly possible that the clone has turned
off its interface to the cellular network).
We also assume that the users have access to an alternative way to authenticate to the
authority. There are several examples of such mechanisms. One example is GMail: If
you forget your password, you can still authenticate by responding to a list of personal
questions that, most probably, only you can respond. In other systems, you might be able
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to authenticate by using a smart-card at your desktop at home. Another example is the PUK
code used in GSM mobile phones. In any case, we assume that the alternative mechanism
to authenticate is secure but long, burdensome, and we definitely want to use it only in rare
and exceptional circumstances like when we need to recover from a clone attack.
From now on, we use 〈m〉E to denote a message m signed by the entity E (e.g. a node
or the CA).
3.2.1 The Adversary and the Problem
We consider a scenario in which an adversary has cloned a device by copying the relevant
contents of its memory, including passwords, cryptographic keys and certificates. By stor-
ing the stolen data on his device, the adversary is now able to interact in the network by
using the victim’s credentials.
We assume that the victim is unaware of the attack and keeps on using his device in a
normal way. This makes the problem more difficult to solve, since, if the user knew that
his identity has been cloned, he could renew his keys and passwords to stop the attack.
Our adversary can be an outsider or an insider. An outsider tries to use the cloned
identity outside of the victim’s community. On the other hand, an insider is interested
in using the cloned identity inside the victim’s community. We fight outsiders with the
Community Certificates subsystem, and insiders with the Personal Marks subsystem.
Our model of the adversary is rather general: He can turn the cloned device on and off
at will, refuse to follow any security protocol and try to eavesdrop any data transmitted or
received by any other device (if he is in its transmission range). Also, we do not make any
assumption on the way he moves. For instance, he could start following the victim or any
other node at all times, though this would require some effort.
A powerful adversary may also infect the victim’s device with a malware that is able to
continuously steal the certificates and the keys from it. We believe that this kind of attack
should be tackled with malware detection techniques [80] and we do not address it directly.
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3.3 The Protocol
In this Section we are going to give a detailed description of the Personal Marks protocol
and the Community Certificates and show how, used together, they make it possible to
detect the clone attack in mobile networks of smartphones.
3.3.1 Personal Marks
Personal Marks is a simple cryptographic protocol that can be used by a node to check if
it has been interacting with two different nodes claiming to be the same node. Personal
Marks is executed each time a node, say node i, meets a node j in its community. The aim
of the protocol is to make it possible for node j to realize if there is another node claiming
to be node i. Personal Marks is made of three parts: channel-creation, mark-check and
mark-exchange.
The channel-creation is done first and it’s meant to make it impossible for an adver-
sary that has cloned node i (i.e. has node’s i private key) to eavesdrop the data exchanged
between the two nodes. The protocol is inspired by the SSL handshake [81]: Node i ran-
domly generates a symmetric key and sends it to node j encrypted with the public key of
node j. Starting from this moment until the end of the Personal Marks protocol, the two
nodes will encrypt their messages using this key. Since the key is encrypted using node’s j
public key, an adversary who has cloned node i cannot read it. The adversary, however,
could also try to perform a man-in-the-middle attack to make node i believe it is node j
and eavesdrop the channel. To make sure that he is using the public key of node j, node i
can, for example, use the certificate signed by the CA to node j. Another possibility could
be that of making node i and node j exchange keys the first time they meet through either
the wireless channel (assuming that an attack doesn’t happen in that short moment), or, for
example, by means a Near Field Communication [82].
The mark-exchange consists on the two nodes exchanging a mark, that is an object in
the form 〈MARK, t〉 ji, signed by both nodes, where t is a timestamp. To exchange the mark,
node j first sends 〈MARK, t〉 j to node i, and node i replies with 〈MARK, t〉 ji. Note that if
the protocol is not completed for any reason (may be for lack of continuous connectivity,
or because one of the two nodes is malicious), the peers can safely assume that it has not
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happened.
The mark-check is done before the mark-exchange protocol when it is not the first
time that node j meets node i. Node j sends a request to which node i has to reply with
〈MARK_RPL, t,m〉i, where t is a timestamp and m is the latest version of the mark node i
received from node j. Note than m was signed by both nodes in the previous contact, so
node i cannot forge it. The mark-check continues with node j checking if the mark m
received by node i is the same as the mark exchanged during the previous contact with
node i. If this is not the case, then node j can be sure that the node i met during the
previous contact was not the same as the current one. Therefore, one of them must be a
clone of the other.
To understand why this is true, assume that node i has been cloned at time t1 and that
node j gets in physical contact with node i for the first time after the attack at time t2 > t1.
In this case both node i and its clone have the same mark m0 = 〈MARK, t0〉 ji in memory,
where t0 < t1. Therefore, independently on whether node i is the clone or the original
node, the mark-check protocol doesn’t fail, and, at the end of the mark-exchange protocol,
node i gets a new mark m1 = 〈MARK, t2〉 ji. The detection is triggered when eventually
node j meets at time t3 > t2 the other node, that, during the mark-check protocol, sends
the message r = 〈MARK_RPL, t3,m0〉i which doesn’t pass the test made by node j. Now,
node j cannot tell which node is a clone, but it can prove that node i has been cloned. The
proof consists on the pair of messages r and m1.The reason this is a proof of the attack is
that, in r, node i declares that at time t3 the latest mark was m0 (generated at time t0), but
at the same time node j has a mark m1 (generated at time t1 > t0) signed by node i that
contradicts this declaration.
Note that the messages r and m1 are signed with the key of node i, thus the proof
cannot be forged by node j. This is an important detail because it makes it impossible for
an adversary to build fake reports and threaten the honest nodes. This proof can be either
sent to the authority by using GSM or broadcasted in the network, and the credentials of
node i are thus revoked. Then, the legitimate node i is invited to re-authenticate and get
new credentials.
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3.3.2 Community Certificates
A community certificate is a cryptographic object used by a node i to prove that he hasn’t
abruptly changed his social behavior. When node i joins the system, it automatically enters
a training period during which it securely collects signed and timestamped logs of the
physical contacts with the other nodes. At the end of the period the logs are reported to the
authority. The authority uses the logs to build a signed certificate ComCi that is sent back to
node i. All these messages are encrypted and authenticated. The certificate is of the form
ComCi = 〈〈FSi,FIi,ki〉CA,SUi〉.
In the certificate, FSi is the community of node j; FIi is a mapping that tells the
“strength of the relationship” between node i and his best friends. More specifically, for
every j ∈ FSi, FIi( j) is a value computed as a function of the inter-contact times between
nodes i and j observed during the training period. Moreover, for every j ∈ FSi, SUi( j) is
an object 〈TIMESTAMP, t〉 j signed by node j where t is a timestamp. This object, called
signed timestamp, certifies at what time there has been the last contact between node i
and j. Signed timestamps are similar to the marks of Personal Marks. However, the two
objects cannot be used interchangeably.
Before sending a signed timestamp to node i, a node j in the set FSi must first check
node i by using the Personal Marks protocol described in the previous Section. Upon
completing the Personal Marks protocol with success, node j sends the signed timestamp
to node i. This is an important detail we will talk about in a short time.
Node i receives signed timestamps through an encrypted channel created with the same
channel-create procedure used in the Personal Marks protocol (it could even be the same
channel created during the execution of the Personal Marks protocol). This prevents the
adversary with node i’s private key to get a copy of the timestamp through eavesdropping
or a man-in-the-middle attack.
Given node j ∈ FSi, we say that the timestamp SUi( j) is fresh at time t if t < SUi( j)+
FIi( j). Certificate ComCi = 〈〈FSi,FIi,k〉CA,SUi〉 is valid at time t if and only if at least k
signed timestamps in set SUi are fresh at time t. In other words, the certificate is valid only
if the node has been able to collect enough fresh signed timestamps by physically meeting
people in his circle of friends.
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When the authority generates the certificate, SUi can be prepared with timestamps
signed by the authority, just to make the certificate immediately valid. Note that all this
process is totally automatic. Note as well that we assume that no attack occurs during the
training period. This is quite reasonable indeed, if such an attack takes place, the author-
ity would receive training logs from both the victim and the clone at the same time, thus
revealing the attack.
3.3.3 Personal Marks and Community Certificates
Personal Marks and Community Certificates, when used together, are able to defend any
honest node i from a clone attack. Let us see how: In our system, having a valid community
certificate is a requirement for the authentication of a node i to the other nodes. Indeed,
when node i wants to set up a communication or to use one of the services provided by a
node j, it will first be asked to show a valid certificate ComCi. This applies also in the case
when node i needs to get a signed timestamp from node j.
Note that node i should never send the certificate ComCi directly since this would make
it possible for the node receiving it to use node i’s identity for the remaining validity time
of the certificate. Node i should instead sign and send an object like 〈ComCi, t, j〉i where
t is a timestamp and j is the public key of the node to which the certificate is being sent.
This would bind the certificate to both the moment it is being used and to the node that is
receiving it, thus making it impossible for any node to reuse it at a later time. Also, the
certificate should always be sent through an encrypted channel created in such a way that
an adversary who copied node i’s private key cannot eavesdrop it (see the channel-create
protocol described in Section 3.3.1).
Let us now consider the scenario where an adversary has just cloned node i, getting,
along with all the keys stored in the node, the valid community certificate ComCi. By
using the certificate, the adversary can interact with any node j of the system pretending to
be node i. Now, if the adversary is an insider, then the attack will eventually be detected
by node j thanks to the Personal Marks protocol. On the other hand, if the adversary is an
outsider, he will be able to use node i’s identity only until the certificate ComCi expires.
The only way an outsider adversary can try to keep on using the cloned identity is to get
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enough fresh signed timestamps from the nodes in the community of node i and use them
to maintain ComCi up to date. However, as explained earlier, before giving a new signed
timestamp, a node j in the community of node i will require the adversary to go through
the Personal Marks protocol and, therefore, will detect the attack.
This is the key idea behind Personal Marks and Community Certificates: While Per-
sonal Marks discourages the adversary from using the cloned identity to interact with the
nodes in the community of the victim, at the same time Community Certificates requires
him to interact with them. Therefore the adversary will either be detected with Personal
Marks or will be able to use the cloned identity for a limited amount of time.
In the experiments with real traces, we show that it is possible to choose FSi, FIi, and k
in such a way that the certificates are continuously and consistently valid when carried by
the legitimate owner and expire quickly when carried by outsiders. Therefore, a combined
use of Community Certificates and Personal Marks is a good way to provide efficient and
secure authentication and to thwart the clone attack.
3.3.4 Dynamic Community Certificates
So far, we have described Community Certificates as a static system. However, in real
life it may be possible, even if it is not common, that we change our own community. In
general, it is reasonable to imagine the following scenarios: (i) our community changes
completely since, for example, we move to another town; and (ii) one of our friends moves
away, or a new node is our new best friend. Here, we see that it is easy to design protocols
to dynamically change the community certificate in a secure way.
In case (i), it is enough to start off a new training phase and to get a new certificate.
In case (ii), we can initiate a selective update of the certificate to remove one node, or to
add a new one, or to update the parameter of a node that is already part of our ring. Of
course, the addition and/or the removal can change all the parameters of the certificate,
like mapping FIi or ki. The procedure can be easily secured. Indeed, when the procedure
starts, the authority sends a GSM message to the node. If a clone requests the procedure
to change the certificate according to his own communities, then the message is received
by the original owner as well, that promptly detects the attack and sends to the authority a
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signed request of certificate revocation.
3.4 Multiple, Coordinated Clone Attacks
Here we consider the problem of detecting a single clone attack. Generally speaking, if
the adversary is very powerful, it is however possible that it clones a whole set of mobile
nodes. While we do not explicitly deal with this case in this work, it is still useful to see
what is going to happen with Personal Marks and Community Certificates.
Let us start with Personal Marks. An insider adversary who clones more than one
node has one main advantage: He can use the stolen private keys either to eavesdrop on
the encrypted channels that two victims establish during the Personal Marks protocol, or
to make the cloned nodes forge marks to each other. In most of the cases, however, this
doesn’t stop Personal Marks to detect the attack anyway. The only thing the adversary can
do is to clone a node i and a node j in node i’s community and make sure that, whenever
he uses a clone of node i to communicate with node j, at the exact same time he uses
the clone of node j to exchange a mark with node i. This would make it impossible for
the two honest nodes to detect the attack since they will store the same mark. Moreover,
whenever the adversary wants to repeat this procedure, he will first have to eavesdrop a
mark-exchange between the honest node i and node j in order to be sure he has the latest
version of the mark.
Though in principle this attack is possible, we think that the amount of effort it requires
is big enough to drastically reduce the probability that the adversary performs it.
A similar argument can be made for Community Certificates: By using the stolen pri-
vate keys, an outsider adversary can either eavesdrop on the encrypted channels that two
victims establish to exchange the signed timestamps, or make the cloned nodes forge signed
timestamps to each other. This means that if the adversary clones a node i and some of the
nodes in its community, he could now get signed timestamps for node i without having to
exchange marks with the honest nodes. If the number of cloned nodes in the community
of node i is high enough, then the adversary can build a valid certificate ComCi (Section
3.3.2).
There are two possible ways we can try to fight back this kind of attack. The first one
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Table 3.1: Details on the datasets (DS) and training periods (TR).
Data set Dartmouth UCSD Reality SWIM
Total nodes 1099 32 45 1500
DS AVG active nodes/day 1034 27 37 1500
TR AVG active nodes/day 980 28 38 1500
DS AVG contacts/node/day 283 49 15 132
TR AVG contacts/node/day 263 51 16 131
is to use a fairly big value of k in the ComCi. This would tradeoff between the risk for
false positives for the node i and the number of nodes the adversary has to clone in order to
generate a valid certificate. A second possibility would be requiring that, to be considered
valid, ComCi has to contain a valid ComCj for each fresh signed timestamp SUi(j). This
extra requirement, however, shouldn’t be applied recursively to the internal ComCj’s so as
to avoid the certificate to become too big.
In this way we would make it harder for the adversary to forge a valid ComCi because,
in order to do that, he would also have to forge valid ComCj for at least ki of the nodes in
FSi. The adversary would therefore be forced to search for a set of nodes which form a
clique and can mutually certificate each other. Considering that, in general, communities
are not closed sets of nodes [23], it should be hard find such a clique. While studying
this attack is out of the scope of this study, it is certainly a open and interesting research
direction.
3.5 Experimental Results
To validate our mechanisms we use four different data-sets. We first start with describ-
ing them and their properties. Then, we show the effectiveness of Personal Marks and
Community Certificates in detecting insiders and outsiders in all datasets.
3.5.1 Datasets
For the experiments we use an event-driven simulator, fed with 4 traces of three types:
WLAN (real)—Dartmouth [59] and UCSD [83]; bluetooth (real)—Reality [84], and SWIM [35]
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simulated traces. In the simulated scenario we are able to select the number of nodes and
the length of the experiment. Rather, in the real scenarios (WLAN and bluetooth), the
datasets suffer from data loss due to periods of low node activity (e.g. people not always
have their devices on), thus we are forced to select a trace period in which nodes are rea-
sonably active.
Dartmouth
It contains SNMP logs of the access points across the Dartmouth College campus from
April 2001 to June 2004. To infer the contacts between the nodes we follow the assumption
widely used in the literature: two nodes can communicate whenever associated to the same
access point [85] [72]. From this trace we have selected a time span of 8 weeks, from
January 5, 2004 to March 1, 2004, during which 1099 nodes have at least 50 contacts a
day for at least the 80% of the days. This ensures us that these nodes remain fairly active
during the whole period.
UCSD
This trace is part of the Wireless Topology Discover project (WTD) [83]. It contains logs
extracted from PDAs carried around campus by a set of about 275 freshmen students of
the University of California San Diego. The trace spans a period of 11 weeks between
September 22, 2002 and December 8, 2002, during which each PDA periodically recorded
the signal strength of all the APs in its range. To infer contacts between nodes we again
use the assumption that two nodes communicate when they are associated to the same
access point. As reported in [85] the trace is characterized by a steady decline of the user
population that especially affects the last two weeks. Thus, we restrict our tests to the first
8 weeks and use the nodes that are fairly active during this period by discarding nodes that
record no contact at all for more than 20% of the time. This selection yields a set of 32
nodes.
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Reality
Differently from UCSD and Dartmouth which are WiFi–based, the Reality [84] trace con-
tains the bluetooth records collected by 94 cellphones distributed to student and faculty on
MIT campus during 9 months (from Sept. 2004 to June 2005). This trace is one of the
few bluetooth–based existing traces this long encompassing a relatively large node num-
ber. Nonetheless, it includes many nodes which have recorded very few to no sightseeings
for long periods of time. In order to keep the amount of active nodes high we thus restrict
ourselves to a period of 8 weeks (Oct. 18th–Dec. 13th 2004) and discard the nodes that
record no contacts (do not appear) for more than 30% of the time. This selection yields a
final set of 45 nodes.
SWIM
This trace is generated by the SWIM model [35, 86], shown to simulate well human mo-
bility in conference and university campus environments and to properly scale a reference
scenario by keeping the nodes density constant. With SWIM we replicate the statistical
and social properties of the Cambridge Campus bluetooth data set [87] (only 11 days long)
increasing both the number of nodes and the time span while preserving the dynamics of
the original real trace in terms of average number of contacts per user: The generated trace
contains 1500 nodes and is 8 weeks long. The simulated nodes do not suffer from battery
insufficiency or other problems that generate periods of low activity in the network. Thus,
with SWIM we use the whole trace with all the 1500 nodes in it.
3.5.2 Training Period
In order to work, Personal Marks and Community Certificates need that nodes “know”
their Friends Set (FSi) and the values FIi to be put in ComCi so that the Authority can
incorporate this information in the certificates. For this reason nodes go through a training
period during which they collect logs of contacts with other nodes. In our experiments
we use the first part of each trace as the training period, whereas the remaining of the
trace is used to test the performance of our security mechanisms. We have experimentally
observed that the training period doesn’t need to be long: Only the first 2 weeks of each
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of FSi sizes and parameter k for all traces.
trace are enough for our system to quickly detect both insiders and outsiders. Table 3.1
includes statistical details of traces and training periods. It is interesting to note that the
characteristics of each trace are similar to those of the respective training period, even
though the training period is just a subset of 2 weeks of the whole trace.
3.5.3 Selecting the right friends is good for your phone
Our mechanisms are built upon a given node’s i friend set (FSi)—the set of nodes whose
signed timestamps are collected by node i—and the respective FIi telling the “strength
of the relationship” between the node and his friends in FSi. As we anticipated in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, FIi( j) defines the period of time in which a signed timestamp given to node i by
a node j ∈ FSi remains fresh (valid). The choice of FSi and FIi is crucial: Large FSi (too
many “best” friends) and big values of FIi (too long time before expiration) clearly reduce
the chances of a honest node to fail proving its identity (the false positive rate). Nonethe-
less, they also increase the chances that the adversary can use cloned certificates for a long
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time. Also, a too big FSi could include nodes that do not have regular contacts with node i.
Thus, this would reduce the effectiveness of Personal Marks in detecting an attempt of the
adversary to refresh the community certificate of the victim.
That said, it is meaningful to restrict FSi to the set of nodes that i is likely to encounter
more often. More in details, we define the set FSi as follows: We compute the average
number of encounters between i and other network nodes. Then we put j in FSi if the
number of encounters with i is larger than the average value. Simultaneously, we set FIi( j)
to be the average time that usually passes from two consecutive encounters between i and
j (their average inter-contact time). In this way, we implicitly include in the certificate i’s
habitual behavior in the network, that is, his “best friends” and how often he meets them.
Note that both FSi and FIi are computed taking into account the training period only.
The distribution of the size of FSi’s for all traces is shown in Figure 3.1(a). In Reality,
UCSD and SWIM traces, most of the sets’ sizes are between 7 and 15. Instead, in Dart-
mouth, FSi sets’ sizes are a bit larger—between 10 and 30 nodes. This happens for two
reasons: (1) Datmouth is more than 20 times bigger than Reality and UCSD, in terms of
number of nodes; (2) even though SWIM is bigger than Dartmouth, the longer range of
the Wi-Fi communication in Dartmouth (vs the bluetooth in SWIM) induces more contacts
among nodes. Even so, we want to stress that the size of the FSi’s in Dartmouth is still
much smaller than the total number of nodes in the network (at most 2%), meaning that our
selection strategy scales well.
3.5.4 Inter-contacts and detection
Suppose node i has been cloned, and that the adversary is an insider that can easily meet
node i’s friends. Take, for example, node j ∈ FSi. Either node i meets j before the clone
does, or vice versa. If the former happens, node i exchanges a mark with friend node j thus
making obsolete the clone’s mark. As a consequence, the next time the clone meets node j
it will be detected. Rather, if it is the clone who first meets node j after the cloning and
exchanges marks with it, victim node’s i mark will result outdated and the anomaly will
eventually be detected during the next meet between nodes i and j. Thus, the amount of
time the clone can get away inside i’s community is bounded by the time-period between
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two consecutive meets of i with his friends—the inter-contact time.
In a similar way, the validity of the certificate ComCi depends again on the inter-contacts
of i and its friends. Indeed, FIi is the average inter-contact time between i and its friends in
FSi. Overall, the better the friends in FSi of a node i are selected, i.e., the more frequently
i meets them, the faster is the detection of insiders (through Personal Marks) and outsiders
(through Community Certificates). In the real-life we would expect that each of us has in
his FS work colleagues, family members etc.. People that we meet daily or even more
often (e.g. office co-workers). And this is what our mechanisms are based upon. However,
the real-traces we use for our experiments are not exactly representing the real life: The
people taking part in the experiment might not be friends, thus, might not frequent each
other with the same rate as it happens to us with our âA˘IJbest friendsâA˘I˙ or family. This is
confirmed when looking at the inter-contacts of nodes with their friends (nodes in FS) of
the real-life traces. The average of such inter-contact time distribution is little more than 2
days in UCSD and Reality, whereas it is little more than 1 day in Dartmouth and little less
than 1 day in SWIM. We would expect then that this is also reflected in the clone detection
time in each trace.
3.5.5 Personal Marks vs Insiders
An insider is one that clones a victim i’s device and hangs out in victim’s community to
keep refreshing his certificate. It can attempt to do so at any moment after the cloning. Sup-
pose, without loss of generality, that the cloning happens after the meeting of i with friend
node j. As we already discussed, through the Personal Marks mechanism the anomaly will
be detected at most after both the clone and the victim meet with j again (no matter in what
order this happens). We do not know when the attacker will meet j, nor we do know when
exactly the cloning happened (if right after i meets j or later on). However, the clone is
interested in seeing j again, to keep renewing the certificate ComCi (remind that j is one of
the nodes in FSi, and that ComCi expires as dictated by FIi–the averages of inter-contacts
between i and j ∈ FSi). So, to test the effectiveness of Personal Marks we measure, for
each node i and each j ∈ FSi, the expected amount of time it will take for them to meet
again starting from any point in time in order to count for the possible instants the attacker
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Figure 3.2
could meet j, and possible cloning times. Then we average the results over all network
nodes and communities. Figure 3.2(a) shows, for all traces, the distribution of the detection
time of an insider with Personal Marks. As expected, the detection time is shorter with
SWIM, where nodes have, on average, shorter inter-contacts. A little bit longer detection
times are yielded by the Dartmouth trace, where again inter-contacts are longer than in
SWIM. However, in both traces the detection for more than 90% lasts less than 1 day and
a half. Accordingly, UCSD and Reality–the two traces with longer inter-contacts among
nodes–yield longer detection times than Dartmouth: less than 2.7 days in UCSD and less
than 3.5 days in Reality for more than 90% of nodes.
However, we note that in real life typically inter-contacts with the people we meet more
often are even shorter than in SWIM: we meet our office co-workers or family members at
least twice a day, vs 1 per day as in SWIM. This makes us think that in a real deployment
the clone would be detected much faster.
3.5.6 False Positives
As we already discussed in Section 3.3.2 a certificate ComCi = 〈〈FSi,FIi,k〉CA,SUi〉 is valid
at time t if and only if at least k signed timestamps in set SUi are fresh at time t. That is,
if node i manages to refresh his certificate by meeting with at least k of its friends. So, the
value k is crucial: It determines the trade-off between high detection performance (high
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k) and low false positives (low k). We first study the lower bound of the false positives
in each trace by setting k = 1, the minimum possible value. In our tests we assume that,
when the community certificate of an honest node expires, then the user asks the Certificate
Authority for a community certificate with a validity of one day. The results of this first
test are encouraging. In Reality, only for 8 over 45 nodes we get false positives: The
certificate expires once for 4 of them, while for the remaining 4 it expires twice. In UCSD
only 3 nodes over 32 show false positives: the certificate expires only once for one node,
whereas it expires respectively 2 and 3 times for the remaining 2 nodes. In the case of
the Dartmouth trace (1099 nodes) only 63 (less than 6%) show false positives. For all of
them, the certificate expires at most 3 times during the whole two months span of the trace.
Finally, in SWIM no node at all suffers from false positives.
In Figures 3.1(b) and 3.1(c) we show the distributions of the values ki that we have
found to be the largest we can use on each node without generating false positives. As
we can see, the optimal values found for the Dartmouth and SWIM traces are bigger than
those found in the Reality and UCSD traces. The reason is that, as already discussed, in
Dartmouth we have bigger sets FSi (more nodes) and the range of the nodes is higher,
while, in SWIM, nodes have more contacts and, consequently, more chances to exchange
signed timestamps with respect to the Reality and UCSD traces. By comparing the values
ki with the sizes of the corresponding sets FSi, we have noted that in the UCSD and Reality
traces, choosing a value of ki around the 10% of the size of FSi is good enough for the
90% of the nodes. In Dartmouth, for 90% of the nodes, ki can be chosen to be around the
25% of the size of FSi, while in SWIM it can be set to the 50%. Taking these values into
consideration, we believe that a good initial choice of the value ki could be the 10% of the
size of FSi and, in case this doesn’t produce false positives, ki could be safely raised up to
values around the 20% or 25% using a tuning procedure like the one described in Section
3.3.4.
3.5.7 Community Certificates vs Outsiders
After we studied the lower-bound of the false positive rate with the Community Certificates
we are ready to study the effectiveness of the mechanism in detecting outsiders, that is,
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attackers that try to get away with cloning a victim’s device by using the device far from
the victim’s community, where the Personal Marks mechanism would promptly detect the
attack. To do so we compute the average expiring time of a cloned certificate (e.g. from a
legitimate node i) in absence of contacts with nodes in the set FSi. This gives us a measure
of the expected amount of time the adversary has available to use a cloned identity outside
the victim’s community. In the experiment, we set ki to be, for each node, the highest value
for which the node is not affected by false positives. The results of our measurements are
plotted in Figure 3.2(b). The first observation we make is that in all traces the duration of
the certificate is never more than 2 or 3 days at worst (UCSD and Reality, respectively),
and roughly between 0.5 and 1.5 days at best (SWIM and Dartmouth, respectively). Again,
the detection is faster in traces with shorter average inter-contacts among nodes (SWIM),
which makes us think that in real-life the performance of the mechanism would be even
better.
3.6 Add-ons and Caveats
Community Certificates can be complemented and extended in such a way to design more
sophisticated and complete versions. Here we discuss two of these addons.
Traveling If we travel, especially alone, our community certificate is going to expire
soon. While this is generally true, we can easily design a solution. The user can prepare two
different profiles, in the same certificate, that can be selected when changing community.
Of course, it is fundamental that these solutions can be used only by the legitimate owner
by performing the burdensome alternative authentication that is used in case of exceptional
events.
Complex patterns It is fairly easy to extend Community Certificates in such a way that
it is not enough to get k fresh signed timestamps from your circle of friends. Rather, the
certificate needs k1 fresh signed timestamps from one sub-community (for example your
family) and k2 fresh signed timestamps from another sub-community (for example your
colleagues) to be valid. A community certificate like this can easily be more efficient and
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more useful in particular situations. For example when we need at least one signature from
one of our bosses to be able to perform critical operations. Or at least one signature from a
fixed infrastructure in the building of our company, for example.
Electronic handshakes In addition to standard physical contacts, Community Certifi-
cates can be extended to use electronic handshakes. Assume that, when meeting a friend,
you use a particular secure "handshake" made with your devices (like bumping the two
together, for example). Handshakes can be used at the place of physical proximity. In this
way, contacts are more trustworthy, but, on the other hand, they need human intervention
and are much fewer in number. Alternatively, handshakes could be used to exchange a
stronger signed timestamp. By using complex patterns, one or more of these handshakes
can be required to enable a higher level of authentication to perform critical operations.
3.7 Conclusions
We introduced Personal Marks and Community Certificates. The fundamental idea of Com-
munity Certificates is that, in networks of mobile people, authentication can be based on
the notion of community, and nodes can authenticate by showing that they indeed meet the
people that are part of their community. While the social structure of these networks has
been extensively used in networking, to the best of our knowledge this is the first time that
this has been used as a biometric to authenticate device. We also present Personal Marks, a
way a community can use to protect itself against insiders performing a clone attack. The
combined used of these mechanisms deliver an excellent protection of the social mobile
network against the clone attack. Indeed our experiments show that the detection is fast
enough considered the slow dynamics of the trace we have used. In any real system, we
believe that the much faster dynamics of meetings can help deliver much faster detection
times.
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Chapter 4
Introduction to Mobile Cloud
Computing
A topic that has recently attracted the attention of the research community is the integration
of cloud computing in the mobile environment, which has given birth to the concept of
Mobile Cloud Computing. With Mobile Cloud Computing, resource constrained mobile
devices can extend their battery lifetime, improve their security, increase their data storage
and their processing power by leveraging the cloud computing infrastructure. To better
frame the topic of the next chapter here we give a short introduction to the aspects of
mobile cloud computing that have been source of inspiration for our work. These include
the recently proposed [88] Clone to Clone system. Note that Mobile Cloud Computing is
a broad, constantly evolving area of research. We refer the reader to [89, 90] for a more
complete overview of the subject.
4.1 Mobile Cloud Computing
The recent explosion of the market of mobile devices has convinced many of us [91,92] that
we are shifting from (or have already shifted to) an era dominated by Personal Computers
(PCs) to one dominated by portable, wireless devices. Today, that the vast majority of the
activities that in the past required us to seat in front of our big, noisy, clumsy computer can
be performed in a much more comfortable, intuitive way using our smartphone or tablet. It
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is therefore not hard to foresee a future where PCs will start disappearing from the houses
and the life of the most of the people, replaced with a wide variety of mobile devices.
From the point of view of the programmers and software engineers, however, things
have become much worse than before: If a few years ago their software was running on
powerful machines with lot of processing power, RAM, hard drive space and with a re-
liable, high-speed, uncapped Internet connectivity, today they are forced to deal with an
environment that has a very limited set of resources available. The resource that is lack-
ing the most in our devices is for sure the battery power, which, in turn, affects all the
other components (i.e., clock speed). Moreover, building smaller and faster hardware, that
doesn’t need an active cooling system, is another serious challenge too. On top of that,
people expect their smartphones and tablets to perform always more complex tasks, like
gaming and video processing, following the same trend that characterized the PC market
in the past.
This increasing gap between the demand for complex applications and the availability
of resources on mobile devices is one of the major concerns of the modern tech industry and
is pushing the research community into exploring solutions to it. This has encouraged the
idea that computation offloading should be taken into consideration as a way to increase the
efficiency of mobile devices by, at the same time, increasing their battery life. Computation
offloading is the practice of migrating parts of a software running on a system (e.g., a
mobile device) to a more resourceful, remote system. Computation offloading, however,
should not be mistakenly confused with the concept of thin-clients [93] that always offload
all their computation to some server.
As Kumar explains in [89], the research on computation offloading dates back to the
middle or late 90’s. Back then, the efforts were focused on trying to make the offloading
process feasible, since the wireless technology was still young (less than 2 Mbit/s) and rep-
resented a severe bottleneck. As the wireless technology (both WiFi and mobile) improved,
the attention shifted to the problem of understanding if, by selecting with care the portions
of code to be offloaded, this technique could really solve the problems of today’s mobile
devices.
But the improvements in the wireless technology are not the only reason why today
we can realistically consider solutions based on computation offloading. A major role is
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also the one played by the cloud computing infrastructure that, with the ability to quickly
allocate virtually infinite resources on-demand, and with the heavy usage of virtualization
techniques, is perfectly able to play the role of the always reachable, reliable and powerful
remote server where the offloading can happen.
In the following sections, we will briefly expose some examples of the most recent
advances in the field of the Mobile Cloud Computing, and we will conclude with the de-
scription of the recently proposed Clone to Clone system [88].
4.2 Computation Offloading
While, in principle, offloading computation to a remote, powerful, server seems like an easy
way to overcome many of the limitations of today’s mobile devices, in practice it presents
several difficulties. The most important one is that sending code and data to be processed
to the cloud can be both a slow and an energy consuming process. It is therefore important
to understand when the offload has to happen and what to offload. Offloading a piece of
computationally intensive code to the cloud may not be a good idea if, for example, the
amount of data that that code depends on is big. In this case, offloading the code may cost
the device more energy and bandwidth than running it locally. Also, there are pieces of
code that heavily depend on the sensors installed on the mobile phone (e.g., the camera)
and that, for this reason, may not be trivial to be offloaded. On the other hand, offloading
a piece of code that consumes a lot of memory, or one that does not require much data
(like a chess engine) may help saving a considerable amount of battery power to the mobile
device.
The authors in [89] identify two main approaches in the literature for the decision of
when the offloading should happen. One, is to make these decisions statically, that is,
during the development phase. The other is to use a decision engine that, based on the
observed conditions of the device (i.e., battery level, available bandwidth, connectivity
type and so on), dynamically decides when it is the right time to perform the offloading.
Obviously, unless the conditions in which the code will be executed can be predicted with
reasonable accuracy, the dynamic method is to be preferred. This is especially true for
mobile devices that, sometimes, have slow, intermittent mobile connectivity, while, some
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other times, can access to a fast and stable WiFi connection.
The process of detecting offloadable portions of the code is generally referred to as code
partitioning. A typical approach is that of representing the program as a graph where the
nodes are the functions to be computed and the edges are the dependencies between them.
Partitioning the code, then, can be reduced to a graph partitioning problem.
Recently, Cuervo et al. proposed MAUI [94], a fine grained, energy aware offload-
ing technique based on the .NET Common Language Runtime. MAUI performs dynamic
decisions on whether to offload computation by combining network and CPU cost with
measurements of the wireless connectivity. The decisions are based on a linear program-
ming formulation of the code offloading problem. MAUI uses programming reflection
provided by the .NET environment in order to identify the context needed for the methods
to be offloaded with minimal intervention from the programmer’s side. Experimental re-
sults show that MAUI can both save up to 47% of energy to the mobile device, and improve
the performances of mobile applications.
In [95] Chun et al. propose an offloading mechanism named CloneCloud. CloneCloud,
as opposed to MAUI, is usable even for applications that were not originally intended to
be offloaded because it does not need any support from the programmer. CloneCloud
determines the pieces of code to be offloaded by means of an offline static analysis of
the binary. Plus, it uses a dynamic profiling to build a cost model for the execution and
migration of the computation. In CloneCloud, the code is offloaded to one or more device
clones running on the cloud, which allows native execution of the code to be offloaded. The
authors show how with CloneCloud virus scanning, image search and behavior profiling
sample applications can get a 20x speed up and, at the same time, a 20x reduction in the
energy consumed on the device.
In [96], Kosta et al. propose ThinkAir, an offloading mechanism that allows method-
level computation offloading with the help of simple annotations on the code. Like MAUI
and CloneCloud, to decide whether a method should be offloaded for execution to the cloud,
ThinkAir uses a runtime mechanism which considers execution time and energy consump-
tion together with environmental parameters like, for example, the network state. ThinkAir
creates virtual machines running the same device’s operating system (i.e., Android) and
allows parallel execution of the code on the cloud.
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These are just three examples of the most recent studies about computation offloading.
Other interesting systems are Cloudlets [97] and the Virtual Smartphone over IP proposed
in cite [98]. For a more complete review of this field, see [89].
4.3 Data Storage
Storage capacity is another limitation of today’s mobile devices that can be alleviated
thanks to the Mobile Cloud Computing paradigm. Indeed, today’s fast wireless connec-
tivity enables mobile devices to store and access relatively large data on the cloud without
using their local memory. In [99], the authors propose ImageExchange, a cloud based ser-
vice that allows users to upload and share the photos immediately after captured them with
their mobile device(s). Flickr [100], Facebook [101], Google Music [102] and iCloud [103]
are vary popular services that, based on the mobile cloud paradigm paradigm, allow users
to store on the cloud the personal data they have on their phone, thus saving precious space
on their device.
Also, systems that regularly send user’s data to remote servers for backup are very valu-
able. The system proposed in [104], besides from backup/restore, also allows for sharing
information in smartphones among groups of people. The authors test their system in terms
of time needed (on the phone) to backup three different data types: SMS, calendar events,
and contacts. In [105] the authors argue that not only contacts and emails—synced by e.g.
Google sync on Android OS—but also application settings, game scores etc., are important
to users. With this in mind they build ASIMS, a tool that has the goal of providing a better
application settings integration and management scheme for Android mobiles. ASIMS is
based on SQLite, it stores other applications’ settings and syncs them to the Internet. Its
interface makes it possible for other applications to store settings in one common place and
for users to select which applications they want to sync.
An interesting example of how mobile cloud computing can simplify the managament
of data stored on mobile devices can be found in [106]. The authors present Dessy, a mo-
bile search and synchronization framework inspired by desktop search applications. Dessy
manages synchronization of data and index files between all the mobile devices of a user
and the cloud, and between the devices themselves. By offloading the indexing and ranking
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of the data on the cloud, Dessy allow mobile devices to save both energy for creating the
index, and energy that could be required to download supplementary data from the Internet.
4.4 Security
The Mobile Cloud Computing paradigm can also help improving the security of mobile
devices. Indeed, the constrained resources of mobile devices would not make it feasible for
an antivirus software to continuously scans for viruses on downloaded files or to monitor
the behaviour of the applications installed. This makes the cloud a perfect place where
these checks could be performed with a minimal energy expense from the side of the de-
vice. Two interesting examples are the system proposed by Oberheide et al. in [107], and
ParanoidAndroid, presented in [108]. Oberheide et al. present an approach to move the
threat detection capabilities to the cloud. Their system is an extension of the cloud AV
platform that provides an in-cloud service for malware detection. The main advantage of
their solution is that moving the detection to the cloud enables the use of multiple antivirus
engines in parallel. On the other hand, in ParanoidAndroid, execution traces of the apps on
the device are recorded and transmitted for analysis on the cloud. The authors show how
this paradigm not only improves detection accuracy, but also saves the battery lifetime up
to 30%.
4.5 Clone to Clone
In [88] the authors propose the Clone to Clone (C2C) platform, which extends the Mo-
bile Cloud Computing paradigm by developing a distributed platform for cloud clones of
smartphones. Clone to Clone associates each smartphone to a software clone on the cloud
(e.g., Amazon EC2) and interconnects the clones in a peer-to-peer fashion using the net-
working service of the cloud. The peers (clones) of the C2C network clearly do not suffer
of battery limitations, unlike their mobile alter-egos since they are running on the cloud.
Indeed, a wireless P2P network between smartphones would be very expensive to realize,
as well as would it suffer from continuous on/off of devices, due to battery insufficiency or
temporary loss of cellular coverage or Internet connection. Such problems are mitigated by
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the C2C platform, where the clones are always on and peer-to-peer connectivity lies upon
the high-bandwidth network of the cloud. Not only can the C2C platform help offload
heavy mobile computational tasks by adopting techniques similar to MAUI, CloneCloud
and ThinkAir, but it also enables innovative services such as content sharing, search, and
distributed execution among the C2C network users.
As a proof of concept of the functionalities of Clone to Clone, the authors implement
CloneDoc and CloneBox. CloneDoc is a real-time collaboration system for smartphone
users that work simultaneously on the same document. CloneDoc is structured as p2p-like
application that makes use of heavy crypto primitives and communication among peers.
On the other hand, CloneBox, is a system that provides smartphone users with a service
similar to DropBox. With CloneBox users can decide which files/directory to share with
whom. The files are actually pushed to the clone of the mobile and shared with the other
authorized users connected on the C2C platform. In their work, the authors show how
CloneDoc and CloneBox can execute on smart-phones by using a very limited amount of
energy thus demonstrating that C2C enables a whole new class of distributed applications
on mobile devices.
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Chapter 5
To Offload or Not to Offload? The
Bandwidth and Energy Costs of Mobile
Cloud Computing
The more eager we get when using our smartphones by installing new apps, the less happy
we are with the lifetime of the battery. The problem is that we rely upon a number of crucial
pieces of information that are only stored in the device (phone numbers, addresses, notes,
appointments, etc.), or, in some cases, that can be got only by using the Internet on the fly
as many of us are used to do. It is so important to keep our smartphone operational that
everyday we pay attention to our battery and try to save it by reducing the number of phone
calls, or by avoiding to watch too many videos, just enough to be able to reach home and
recharge it. But that means that we cannot use our device to the fullest.
As discussed in the previous chapters, Mobile Cloud Computing seems an excellent
candidate solution to help reduce battery consumption of smartphones, as well as to backup
user’s data. Indeed, recent works have focused on building frameworks that enable mo-
bile computation offloading to software clones of smartphones on the cloud as well as to
backup systems for data and applications stored in our devices. Both mobile computation
offloading and data backup involve communication between the real device and the cloud.
However, this communication does not come for free, in terms of both energy consumption
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(utilization of network interfaces to send the data) and bandwidth. None of the many previ-
ous works related to mobile cloud computing explicitly studies the actual overhead in terms
of bandwidth and energy to achieve full backup of both data/applications of a smartphone,
as well as to keep, on the cloud, up-to-date clones of smartphones for mobile computation
offload purposes. In this chapter we address both issues, and, for the first time (to the best of
our knowledge), we provide results with a real testbed of 11 Android powered smartphones
and associated clones running on the Amazon EC2 platform. This work, appeared in [4],
is the result of a collaboration with P.h.D. Student S. Kosta from Sapienza University.
5.1 Energy efficiency of Mobile Cloud Computing
The mobile cloud computing paradigm has, among its main objectives, that of saving mo-
bile devices’ battery life. For this reason, in literature, there are a number of studies that try
to give at least an approximate answer about whether there can be an actual energy gain for
mobile devices in performing computation offloading. Analytical models have been pro-
posed, for instance, in [109–111]. In [109], the authors give a formula that expresses the
amount of saved energy in terms of factors like the number of instructions to be offloaded,
the computational power of the mobile device, the available bandwidth and the energy re-
quired to send the data to the cloud. In [110] the authors present an analytical study to
find the optimal execution policy. This is identified by optimally configuring the clock fre-
quency in the mobile device to minimize the energy used for computation and by optimally
scheduling the data rate over a stochastic wireless channel to minimize the energy for data
transmission. By formulating these issues as a constrained optimization problem they ob-
tain close-formed solutions which give analytical insight in finding the optimal offloading
decision. The authors of [111] discuss on the main factors that affect the energy consump-
tion of mobile apps in cloud computing, and deem that such factors are workload, data
communication patterns, and usage of WLAN and 3G. However, these works are limited to
consider best case scenarios—ideal WiFi connectivity and WiFi interface always switched
on.
In [112] the authors argue that previous frameworks that enable offloading are inaccu-
rate in estimating the energy of a certain workload in the system. This is because they do not
84
operate at kernel level. With this in mind they present AppScope, an Android-based energy
estimator implemented as a kernel module that uses an event-driven monitoring method.
By operating at kernel level their framework yields energy consumption estimation values
that are very close to the ones obtained through the Mobile Device Power Monitor1, a tool
used also in other works in the area [94, 113].
To the best of our knowledge there is no study on the cost of keeping updated a clone
or a backup on the cloud in a real setting with real mobile smartphone users, where Inter-
net connectivity is often guaranteed by WiFi only at home and at work, by 2G/3G when
moving outside these areas, and where coverage is often not present (think of subways, for
example).
5.2 Off-clones and Back-clones
In our study we assume an architecture as Clone to Clone [88], CloneCloud [95] and
ThinkAir [96], presented in Chapter 4, where each real device is associated to a software
clone on the cloud. For the mobile computation offloading to work, the status of the appli-
cations running on the clone needs to be in sync (as accurately as possible) with the ones
running on the real device. In order to allow users to offload mobile computation on the fly,
the clone must run the same applications the real device is running. In addition, also the
state of both the real application (the one running on the device) and the cloned application
(the one running on the clone), has to be the same. We will refer to a clone that is used to
offload computation on the fly as an off-clone, and to a clone that is used to backup user’s
data and to enable restore as a back-clone (backup clone). Since the goal of the back-clone
is to restore user’s data and the system (including installed apps) in case of system/data
corruption or loss, it does not need to keep up with any single application’s status in time,
as in the case of the off-clone. Yet, it needs to be up to date with all sort of data gener-
ated/received by the user like notes, pictures, videos, contacts, calendar entries, messages,
emails etc.
Our goal in this work is to study the feasibility of both mobile computation offloading
and mobile software/data backups in real-life scenarios. We give a precise evaluation of the
1http://www.msoon.com/LabEquipment/PowerMonitor/
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feasibility and costs of both off-clones and back-clones in terms of bandwidth and energy
consumption on the real device. Our contribution is as follows:
• We study the network availability (2G/3G, WiFi etc.) as well as the signal quality
in a real testbed of mobile smartphone users, with reference to the requirements of
offloading and backup on the cloud;
• we study the data communication overhead that is necessary to achieve different
levels of synchronization (once every 5min, 30min, 1h, etc.) between devices and
clones in both the off-clone and back-clone case;
• we report on the costs in terms of energy incurred by each of these synchronization
frequencies as well as by the respective communication overhead.
To achieve all the above we design and build Logger, an Android app that runs in the
foreground and collects data on the utilization of the device. Logger also handles the com-
munication between the real device and the cloud. We run Logger on a testbed of 11 smart-
phones (associated to 5 different carriers) that make use of clones running on the Amazon’s
EC2 cloud platform.
5.3 The Logger
Studying the overheads incurred by the off-clones and the back-clones is not easy. It de-
pends on how user actually uses her device, on the properties of the network technologies
(WiFi/3G/ etc.) and on which of these technologies is actually available and used. So, we
develop Logger, an Android app that continuously logs the events occurring in the device.
These includes user and system generated events. Examples of user generated events are:
Mail sending and receiving, phone calls (both incoming and outgoing), files exchanged
over blue-tooth, device switching on and off, battery charging, installing and uninstalling
applications. Examples of system generated events are: Access to network interfaces (e.g.
regular heartbeat pings to Google’s servers), access to GPS radio (e.g. Google Latitude or
Facebook), generation and editing of internal files by apps, automatic updates, and so on.
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The Logger service is structured into sub-components, each responsible for logging
data coming from a given resource. While some information about the device state can
be logged passively by our Logger using standard facilities provided by the Android OS,
collection of other statistics require the Logger to actively and recurrently send requests
to the OS. In the remaining of this section we give details on both the passive and active
aspects of our Logger. Also, we describe the difficulties we faced in building this tool and
how we overcame them.
5.3.1 Passive data collection
Some of the Android OS components are loosely coupled (e.g. network interfaces and the
browser). To make them communicate the Android OS provides the Intents—instances
of the android.content.Intent class. Intents are asynchronous messages and can be used
to perform all sorts of operations: Requesting the system to launch applications, asking
the user to select a WiFi network to connect to, sending notification messages to other
applications, signalling the Android system that a certain event has occurred (e.g. message
received, connection available, etc.). In this latter case, a component interested in a specific
event does not have to actively send the system requests on the occurrence of the event. It
suffices that the component registers to the specific event through the so called intent filters,
and it will be notified by the system as soon as the selected event occurs.
Our Logger uses Intents to be notified about changes in the device connectivity (2G,
3G, WiFi), of the battery status (charging, discharging, current battery life), of the screen
state (on/off) etc.
5.3.2 Active data collection
Data collected passively through Intents are not enough for our study. Statistics as network
data usage, for example, cannot be obtained through Intents. In this case, the Android OS
has to actively be sent specific requests by the interested component. In Android systems
this is achieved through Alarms—actions scheduled to be executed recurrently, even when
the device is in sleep mode.
So, we built a set of alarms and included them in our Logger architecture in order to log
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data exchanged through the network interfaces, the set of currently running applications,
incoming and outgoing emails, SMSs, phone calls, and so on.
5.3.3 Filesystem activity
Monitoring the filesystem’s activity includes logging information on when and how each
file or directory was created, deleted, accessed, and modified. This information is clearly
important in both the study of the off-clones (as far as files internal to single applications
are concerned) and back-clones (user-generated files). The Alarms are not suited to achieve
this: They would require very frequent scan of the whole filesystem, which would be in-
accurate, aside from being very expensive in terms of battery consumption. Fortunately,
the underlying Linux kernel on which Android OS is based includes Inotify—a filesystem
monitoring service with a similar approach to that of Intents. Inotify allows applications
to add so called watches to directories. Whenever one of the watched directories, or its
content, is modified, the kernel promptly notifies the “watching application”. The Android
OS provides user-level applications with a Java interface to the Inotify subsystem.
The notifications are sent only when something actually happens on the filesystem.
So, the interface to the Inotify subsystem allowed our Logger to get the most accurate
information possible about the filesystem changes at a minimal cost in terms of resources.
Inotify does not allow to watch for changes happening in the subdirectories of a directory.
To overcome this problem the Logger, when started, adds watches to all the directories in
the filesystem tree of the device. In addition, whenever a new directory is created/deleted
the watch is added/removed automatically by the Logger. It is worth noting that adding each
directory of the filesystem tree to the Inotify watch list is not expensive in terms of memory
and computational resources, and it did not affect the user experience in a noticeable way.
5.3.4 File permissions
An Android device storage is usually composed of an external storage unit, in the form of
an SD card, and one or more internal storage units. The external SD card is where most of
the user files are stored (mp3s, pictures, etc.). Conversely, system files like config files and
system binaries are stored in the internal storage unit. The SD card storage (usually a FAT32
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filesystem) is the one with the highest capacity (for example 10 GB) and is accessible in
read/write mode by all the apps without restrictions. While it is possible for an app to
have its data stored on the SD card (this is very useful for large apps like games or other
media-based ones), most of them are installed in the internal storage space.
As opposite to the external SD card, the access to the internal storage (an ext3 or ext4
filesystem) is restricted: A user-level app is only allowed to access its private data (usu-
ally stored in the /data/data/ directory). This prevents any user application (including our
Logger), to add Inotify watches to the private directories of other apps. To overcome this
limitation we root the devices of our experimental testbed. By rooting a device, an appli-
cation can execute commands using the root permissions, thus going past the restrictions
of user applications, including those on filesystem access. Our Logger, even though run-
ning on a rooted device, is not allowed to execute its own code with root permissions. It
is however enabled to execute shell commands as root. This permits us to use the Unix
shell included in Android OS to temporarily change the permissions of private application
files. The permission changing step takes place during the starting phase of the Logger.
The old permissions are saved into a database (internal to Logger), and are restored when-
ever it is stopped by the user. To make the permission changing phase as independent as
possible from the Android platform we used BusyBox [114] a popular lightweight collec-
tion of Unix tools largely used and optimized for embedded systems. Finally, with these
modifications, the Logger is enabled to add Inotify watches to files that are private to other
apps.
5.3.5 Dealing with file modifications
Once Inotify sends a notification to our Logger about the modification/editing of a directo-
ry/file, we need to understand the amount of data that we should upload to the cloud so to
keep the clone up-to-date with the user’s device. Of course, uploading has to be performed
in an efficient way—we certainly do not want to upload the whole file/directory each time
it is modified. A standard technique is to send just incremental modifications of the file,
instead of the whole file. Unfortunately, nor does Inotify provide details on the amount of
data that was modified, neither does it keep track of the modified file portion. So we had
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to find a method to identify the file portions involved in a modification that was fast and
lightweight. Fast, so that it could cope with frequent modifications occurring in the system.
Lightweight, so that its overhead is low and it would not affect the user experience. For all
these reasons we decided to apply the rolling hash [115] technique, widely used on popular
backup/sync software rsync [116]. Rolling hash is one of the possible implementations
of the so called binary-diff, used also by Dropbox to update users’ modified files yet not
wasting users’ network bandwidth2. This technique allows to compute very quickly (in
linear time with respect to file sizes) hashes of all possible file blocks (the block size is
a parameter of the rolling hash technique). So, it makes possible to quickly compute the
amount of data (in terms of blocks) that make two file versions differ. A very detailed and
clear description of the rolling hashes technique (including how to compute it and how to
deal with hash collisions) can be found in [115].
We built from scratch a Java implementation of the rolling hash technique, and included
it as one of the modules of our Logger app. Old rolling hashes of files are maintained into
a SQLite database (stored in the phone’s SD card) so that they are promptly available to be
compared with the new rolling hashes each time files are modified. The block size we used
in our implementation equals 8KB, the same used by rsync.
Our implementation of the rolling hash technique turned out to be very efficient in
computing and comparing hashes. Nonetheless, we believe that an implementation written
in native code (C/C++) and running as a root process would dramatically improve the
performances. We leave this as future work.
5.3.6 Logger output
The data collected by each component of the Logger is continuously written to a log file (a
simple text file) that is periodically rotated, compressed and stored onto a special directory
within the SD card reserved to the Logger. The user, on request, can also trigger sending
emails with the content of this directory, from time to time, to a custom gmail account we
created for this purpose. If the user does so, the log files that are successfully sent by email
are deleted from the device.
2https://www.dropbox.com/help/8/en
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Number, type & OS CPU RAM
7×Samsung Galaxy S Plus 1.4 GHz Scorpion 512 MB
(Android 2.3)
2×Samsung Galaxy S 1 GHz Cortex-A8 512 MB
(Android 2.3)
1×Samsung Galaxy Note 1.4 GHz dual-core Cortex-A9 1 GB
(Android 2.3)
1×Samsung Galaxy Nexus 1.2 GHz dual-core Cortex-A9 1 GB
(Android 4.1)
Table 5.1: Phone specifications.
5.4 Experimental results
Our experiments are based on a testbed of real users. In this section we describe the testbed,
the results, and the observations of our study on the cost of keeping updated both off-clones
and back-clones in the cloud.
5.4.1 Experimental setting
To gather data related to the device usage we set up a testbed of 11 smartphones running
our Logger app. In addition, the testbed consists of an equal number of software clones—
customized AMIs of the Android x86 OS [88]—running on the Amazon’s EC2 platform.
Logger makes the device communicate with the clones to collect data related to networking.
The details of the mobile devices involved in the experiment are shown in Table 5.1.
The devices were used as primary smartphones for the whole duration of the experiment
(the experiment lasted 3 weeks) and involved people living in the city of Rome, Italy, and
Cambridge, UK. The profiles of the participants are heterogeneous in age and occupation—
university students, faculties, and part-time and full-time workers that are completely ex-
ternal to the university. So is the technology they use to connect to the Internet with their
mobile devices: One of the participants does not have a cellular data traffic plan, so he
connects only through WiFi networks (home or work). Another participant does not have
an available WiFi network neither at home nor at work, so he only makes use of 2G/3G
technology. The remaining participants use habitually both cellular data traffic and WiFi
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Figure 5.1: Average daily connectivity percentage for various technologies.
interchangeably.
During the experiment the participants used their own contract with the service provider
of their choice. The data we gathered includes the four major cellular service providers in
Italy, namely, TIM, Vodafone, Wind and 3, as well as O2, a major provider in UK. It is
worth to note that, though each of these carriers relies on its own network infrastructure,
they all provide cellular data traffic plans with the same upload and download speed in best
case scenarios. The actual speed and availability depend, of course, on the quality of the
signal and on the load of the cells that are used by the participants during the three weeks
of the experiment. As this is an element that might impact the performance of mobile cloud
paradigms, we start our study with network availability.
5.4.2 Mobile data traffic and network availability
Certainly one of the most important component to keep both off-clones and back-clones
updated is the ability of the real devices to communicate often and efficiently with the
cloud. Often, so that the user can send data to the cloud anytime she needs. Efficiently,
so that the overhead of this communication is as low as possible and does not impact the
usability of the system. Indeed, if the networking process becomes a bottleneck to usability
then people will not be happy about it, and they will less likely accept and use mobile cloud
systems.
The first network related result that we present is the average amount of time per day,
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Figure 5.2: Network properties.
in percentage, users spend connected either to 3G/2G or to WiFi networks (see Figure 5.1).
The first observation that we make is that the percentage of the daily time period during
which the devices are connected is quite high (more than 90%), and the trend is similar for
all the days of the week. The periods of disconnection are either due to areas with no signal
at all (e.g. subways), or due to periods in which the devices are switched off. The time of
connectivity using the three different networking technologies (WiFi, 3G, 2G) is also quite
stable from day to day: Around 45% of WiFi, around 40% of 3G, and the remaining of
2G. This partitioning is particularly positive being WiFi and 3G the two communication
technologies with larger bandwidth.
Keeping off-clones and back-clones up-to-date requires the device to upload data to
the cloud. For this reason we measure, separately for 3G/2G and WiFi, the average speed
in upload during the real life conditions of our testbed. We achieve the measurement by
making Logger send a file of 300kB from each device to its clone on the Amazon platform
every 30 min, keeping track of the technology used to send the data, and averaging the
results. We compute the average speed for every user (per day). Figure 5.2(a) shows the
average as well as a representation of the distribution of the values: Minimum, 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentiles, and maximum. By doing so we are able to depict in the graphic
results related to scenarios where the user happens to be in zones that are not well covered
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by wireless technology.
Let us first focus on comparing 3G with 2G connectivity. When using 2G/3G technol-
ogy, smartphones switch from 3G to 2G whenever the 3G signal is not present or lower
than a certain threshold, which depends on the smartphone type. As expected, the 2G up-
load speeds are much lower than the 3G ones (see Figure 5.2(a)). Fortunately, this 3G to
2G switch typically happens only for short periods of time (see Figure 5.1). WiFi connec-
tions are faster than 3G ones, as far as download is concerned. However, the mobile cloud
paradigm requires that the majority of traffic travels from the real devices to the cloud, to
keep the clone up-to-date. The results in Figure 5.2(a) show that the average upload speeds
are higher in the 3G case with respect to WiFi. This is not surprising: When accessing
the WiFi users typically set up their devices to automatically connect to known and trusted
WiFi routers that are at their home or work locations. These in Italy are generally ADSL
WiFi routers, and thus they do not provide high speed in upload. This last consideration
makes think that, when a device is being charged, it is more likely to be connected to a
WiFi network—usually we charge our devices at home or at work where WiFi is available.
Not to mention that ADSL connection providers make users pay fixed prices for unlimited
bandwidth. So, exploiting WiFi networking to keep clones up-to-date is more likely to
come for free in both terms of costs (no cellular data traffic is used) and energy (the device
has more chances to be charging).
Figure 5.1 shows that the overall WiFi connection time per day is high, around 45%
of the time. However, it is important to see how this period of time is distributed over
the day. This is an important question to address. Indeed, as long as the device is under
WiFi coverage, keeping off-clones and back-clones updated is cheap and therefore users
might configure the system in such a way to use WiFi only to sync. So, we are interested
in checking whether it is frequent that users are without WiFi connection for long period
of times. A technical way to check this property is to compute the distribution of the
intervals between the end of a period of WiFi coverage and the start of the next period of
WiFi coverage. We refer to this time as the WiFi inter-contact time. The results of our
experiments to this respect are shown in Figure 5.2(b).
From Figure 5.2(b) we can see that 20% of the WiFi inter-contact times are lower
than 20 min, 40% are lower than 30 min, 50% are lower than 2h. Just 35% of them are
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higher than 1 day. Considering that among the participants there are also people that do
not use WiFi at all, this result is excellent—50% of WiFi inter-contact times are as low as
2h and that means that 50% of the times users can rely on WiFi connection to sync their
device’s clones as frequently as every 2 hours or more. And, as we already discussed, this
makes users save their cellular data traffic, and, possibly, save battery (if during the WiFi
connectivity they are charging their device at home or at work.).
5.4.3 Overhead of Mobile Cloud Computing
To keep off-clones and back-clones up-to-date devices need to recurrently access the net-
work interfaces to send the latest user-generated data and app statuses to the respective
clones. Clearly, the more often the device syncs with the clone, the better the clones rep-
resent the status of the device. Though, frequent syncs incur higher bandwidth and energy
overhead to the real device. The overhead depends on the network technology involved in
the device-cloud communication (WiFi vs 2G/3G), as well as on how the device is used—
for example, the more pictures a user takes with her device’s camera the more data have to
be transferred to the user’s back-clone. The user should be able to trade-off this overhead
with the synchronization level of the clone of her device, and decide the rate of synchro-
nization that better suits her needs.
Off-clone synchronization requires information on the user apps. For a given app this
information includes the app’s state, its internal private files, its settings specified by the
user, and so on. Back-clone synchronization requires informations on the apps that are
installed in the device and user’s data (contacts, calendars, pictures, music, notes, emails,
SMS etc.). As we already anticipated in Section 5.3, the Logger computes, at the end
of specific time-intervals that correspond to sync frequencies, the amount of data that the
device should send to the cloud in order to update each clone type. In particular we recall
that, when a file is modified, we use the efficient rolling hash technique to compute the
difference between the new and the old version of the file. The sync intervals that we have
considered are 5 min, 30 min, 1h, 2h, 6h, 12h, and 24h. To keep it as real as possible, the
Logger computes the amount of data to be sent at the end of each interval only if either
2G/3G or WiFi connectivity is available.
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Network bandwidth overhead
In Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b) we plot, for both clone types, the quartiles of the distribu-
tion of the average (per user) daily traffic needed to be sent to the cloud in dependence
of the sync frequency in order to keep off-clone and back-clone updated. The first sim-
ple observation that we make is that the traffic overhead incurred by the synchronization
decreases as the sync interval increases. This phenomenon is straightforward—while the
device is running there is a large number of files/directories generated and then destroyed
in the system (temporary files). Typically, this happens more frequently with system or
app private files rather than with user generated files. Indeed, the results in Figure 5.5, that
show the complementary cumulative distribution of the file lifetime for both clone types
in the device, confirm this intuition—more than 90% of off-clone files last less than 1s,
while more than 90% of back-clone files last longer than 5 days. If the device-cloud syn-
chronization interval is long, most of the temporary files generated during the interval do
not last till its end—when the file diffs are computed. On the contrary, if the sync interval
is short, it is more likely that temporary files are still “alive” at the end of the interval, so
they are involved in the file diffs. This is what boosts up the overhead traffic incurred by
small synchronization intervals even in the presence of a smart incremental backup system
like that we implemented. As this is more likely to happen with system/app private files,
the difference between the overhead traffic generated by the synchronization for different
sync interval lengths is smaller for back-clones—these clones involve more user-generated
data (like sent/received emails, texts, calls, and so on) which is rarely deleted by the user.
Another important observation is that, for small sync intervals, the back-clones incur much
less overhead (around 4 times less) than the off-clones. Again, this is due to the fact that the
user generates data with much less frequency with respect to the system, and typically do
not delete their data. The overhead difference between the two types of clones is attenuated
when the interval of syncs increases (see Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b)).
Lastly, for both types of clones, the bandwidth overhead incurred is not excessive, if
we compare it to the data traffic normally generated by the user’s device to receive/send
mail, access Facebook/Twitter accounts etc. For the sake of comparison we have plotted,
in Figure 5.4, the quartiles of the average traffic generated normally by the users per day.
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Figure 5.3: Bandwidth overhead for clone synchronization in dependence of the sync fre-
quency. The graphics include the minimum and maximum speed value as well as the 25th,
50th and 75th percentile.
Energy overhead
To measure the energy overhead incurred by the sync of back-clones and off-clones we
make use the Mobile Device Power Monitor, an external power meter widely used to val-
idate offloading frameworks esteems [94, 112, 113]. The device samples the smartphone’s
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Figure 5.4: Average (per user) data traffic sent/received per day.
battery with high frequency (5000 Hz) so to yield accurate results on the battery’s power,
current, and voltage. Clearly, we could not do the measurement when the devices were with
the users. So, at the end of the experiment, we gathered the devices and re-simulated the
device-cloud communication for each smartphone with the device connected to the Power
Monitor. The simulation included re-computation of the amount of data to be sent to the
clones at the end of the time-interval considered, as well as the data sending process. The
clones involved are customized Amazon AMIs (Amazon Machine Image) of the Android-
x86 OS and run on the Amazon EC2 platform.
The simulation is run 20 times for every device: 10 times using WiFi connectivity and
the other 10 times using 3G connectivity. Figures 5.6(a) and 5.6(b) show the trend of the
energy overhead in the case of WiFi connectivity for both off-clones and back-clones in
dependence of the sync frequency. Similarly, Figures 5.6(c) and 5.6(d) show the trend
of the energy overhead in dependence of the sync frequency in case of 3G connectivity.
There are several considerations to be made. First, let us consider WiFi sync compared
to 3G sync of the same clone type. See, for example, Figure 5.6(a) and Figure 5.6(c) that
depict the results for the off-clones. When the same clone type is considered, the energy
overhead difference is determined by the communication technology used. Indeed, the
energy dissipated to compute the file diffs is the same, being that we are comparing the
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same clone types among them. However, the energy consumed in computing the rolling
hashes of the files dominates the energy required to actually send the diffs. As a result, the
overall energy overhead of the sync through WiFi is slightly lower than the overhead of the
sync done through 3G. The difference is of the order of tens of Joule.
Now, let us focus on one communication technology, say, WiFi, and compare the energy
overhead to sync off-clones (Figure 5.6(a)) with the energy overhead to sync back-clones
(Figure 5.6(b)). It is worth noting that, although off-clones incur higher energy costs than
back-clones, the difference in energy requirement is much more attenuated than the dif-
ference in traffic overhead. This is so for the following reason: As shown in Figure 5.5,
off-clones generate many small temporary files (the system files). On the other hand, the
files generated by the back-clones are user-generated files. Typically, these are bigger, are
generated with a lower frequency, and last longer. So, the computation load of the file diffs
is somehow balanced in the two cases—For the off-clones the rolling hashes are computed
very frequently times on small files; for the back-clones, the rolling hashes are computed
much less frequently on bigger files. The energy for this computation dominates the en-
ergy required to send the file diffs. So, even though back-clones generate 4 times less traffic
overhead than off-clones, the difference of the overall energy spent to compute the diffs and
to send them to the cloud for both clone types is attenuated. The same observation holds
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Figure 5.6: Energy overhead for clone synchronization through WiFi (a and b) and through
3G (c and d) in dependence of the sync frequency. The graphics include the minimum and
maximum speed value as well as the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles.
for the case when 3G technology is used in the device-clone communication.
That said, it is worth noting that mobile cloud computing does not impact much the
life of the battery. The smartphones we used in our testbed are powered by Lithium–
Ion batteries (1650 mAh, 3.7 V). These batteries, if fully charged contain 21.9 KJoule
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of energy. According to our experiments, synchronizing off-clones (back-clones) every 5
minutes, incurs, at max, around 11.8 KJoule (8 KJoule) of energy overhead per day (see
Figure 5.6). This means that the sync cost is about 53% (36%) of the battery. These
values certainly correspond to an extreme scenario—keeping the clone updated every 5
min certainly has its cost. As soon as lower synchronization frequencies are considered
these values are drastically reduced. For 30 min (2h) sync intervals the synchronization
cost drops to around 11% (2.7%) of the battery for the off-clone and around 8% (2.3%) of
the battery for the back-clone.
Lastly, the differences in terms of energy overhead between off-clones and back-clones
(being it WiFi or 3G) are attenuated with the increasing of the synchronization interval.
In addition, large synchronization intervals yield much lower energy overhead than short
ones.
5.5 Lesson learned and conclusions
In this work we have described our experience with a testbed of real users of smartphones
and a mobile cloud system of smartphone software clones in the cloud. The goal of the
experiment is to understand the feasibility of mobile cloud systems in a real setting—a
setting consisting of people (participants in the experiment) using the smartphone as their
primary device during their everyday life. In the experiment, the participants made use of
their mobiles just as usual for three weeks. Here are some of the key observation we made
during this experience:
• Most of the users are virtually always under the coverage of some wireless technol-
ogy. In particular, almost 50% of the time smartphone users are connected to a WiFi
access point. Indeed, this is often the case at home and at work (recall that these
numbers are computed as the average of all the participants);
• In more than 50% of the cases, users lose WiFi coverage for just for 2 hours at most.
This is probably due to commuting between places with WiFi, like work and home.
For a systems point of view, it means that sync operations can optimistically wait
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until the device is connected to a WiFi access point, and that most probably this is
going to happen in a short period of time.
• Synchronizing back-clones (for backup purposes) requires less network traffic (down
to 4 times less) and less energy overhead (around to 3 KJoule less) than synchronizing
off-clones (that handle mobile computation offload).
• The difference in overhead incurred by the synchronization of the two clone types
decreases drastically as the sync frequency decreases; reasonable sync frequencies
like 30 min have a reasonable cost in term of energy spent on the device to keep
off-clones and back-clones updated (11% of the battery for the off-clones and 8% for
the back-clones sync). Recall that by paying this overhead, the user either has a very
efficient backup system or can efficiently offload computation on the fly. This latter
service has the potential, depending on the application, to reduce energy consumption
by a factor that is much higher than the cost we computed in this experiment.
• Finally, WiFi technology incurs lower overhead with respect to 3G. However, the
overall energy overhead, which depends also on the workload before the device-
cloud communication, is almost the same with both communication technologies.
Our work supports the conclusion that mobile cloud computing can be sustained by
continuous update of software clones in the cloud with a reasonable overhead in terms of
bandwidth and energy costs, especially if the sync intervals are not too short.
102
Future Work and Concluding Remarks
The past few years have been characterized by an explosion of the market of mobile de-
vices. It all started with the awkward and poorly designed first models of PDAs of the mid
90’s, that had relative success only among a small market niche of early adopters with very
specific needs. In the following years things changed slowly, until a “revolution” happened
around 2007, when faster, more appealing devices suddenly became extremely popular to
the general public too. We reached a point where everyone has, or longs for, a smartphone
or a tablet (or both), and it is clear that it won’t take long for the market to expand up to sat-
uration like it happened in the past for the phone or the television [117]. During my P.h.D I
studied what, in my opinion, represent the most important issues affecting this PostPC-era,
which regard data connectivity, security and energy efficiency of the mobile devices. In try-
ing to solve these issues I used an hybrid approach, taking the best of different technologies
to create new solutions.
We started with the lessons learned from the field of Pocket Switched Networks (PSNs).
The insights on the statistical properties of human meeting patterns allowed us to tackle two
important problems, namely, the overloading of the network infrastructure and the identity-
theft. For what concerns the first problem, we showed how it is possible to identify a set
of important subscribers, the VIPs, that can act as a bridge between the other subscribers
and the network provider whenever a large set of data has to be transferred to/from the
network. Our experiments showed that this technique is indeed effective in reducing the
load on the network infrastructure even when the set of VIPs is less than 10% of the nodes
in the network. As a future work, we would like to consider a more realistic communication
model, that takes into consideration, for example, the sizes of the data to be transferred.
Then, we showed how to exploit the regularity of the meeting patterns of people in
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order to define a new authentication mechanism that is resistant to the identity theft (or
cloning). We introduced Personal Marks and Community Certificates. Personal Marks
detect whenever a cloned identity is used inside the community of the victim. On the other
hand, Community Certificates prevent the unauthorized use of the cloned identity outside
of the community of the victim. Used together, these two systems allow to unmask an
attack that other authentication mechanisms fail to detect. In the future, we will use a new
dataset we collected with the purpose of testing the system in a more accurate way, using
previously unavailable information about all the different aspects of the social life of the
users.
From the PSNs we then moved to the clouds. We considered how the usage of software
clones of mobile devices running on the cloud infrastructure can help fighting the spread
of social mobile malware. In this context, CloudShield is a suite of strategies able to detect
a small set of clones that, if used to patch the respective devices, can quickly stop the mal-
ware from infecting the whole network. We also considered the eventuality that the cloud
itself becomes a channel for the spread of the malware and used a quarantine strategy to
stop it. Our evaluations performed with real datasets have shown that our strategies are sim-
pler, faster to compute and more effective than the state of the art of malware containment
techniques. In the future, we plan to study the scenario of smarter malware that explicitly
tries to fool our patching strategies.
Finally, we studied the feasibility, in terms of energy and bandwidth consumption, of
mobile cloud systems in a real setting. We considered, again, a scenario where mobile
devices have a respective software clone on the cloud that they can use to offload compu-
tationally intensive tasks or to backup their data. To do so, we collected data about the
regular use of the smartphone of a set of 11 participants for a period of three weeks. Our
data shows how much time users spend connected to WiFi or 3g, how much download
and upload bandwidth they have available and how the frequency of updates sent from the
smartphones to their clones in the cloud impacts the energy and bandwidth consumption.
In the future we would like to extend the study to a larger set of volunteers.
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